考虑泄露风险的在线平台隐私收集策略研究  

Research on Privacy Collection Strategies for Online Platforms Considering the Risk of Data Leakage

作　　者：鲍磊 何逢标[1] 李迎迎 BAO Lei;HE Feng-biao;LI Ying-ying(School of Business,Huaiyin Normal University,Huai an,Jiangsu 223001)

机构地区：[1]淮阴师范学院商学院,江苏淮安223001

出　　处：《淮阴师范学院学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第1期28-36,107,108,共11页Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：2022年度江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目“考虑消费者个人信息价值的本土企业和外资企业竞争研究”(2022SJYB1901);2022年度江苏省社会科学基金项目“数字经济背景下用户隐私数据安全风险及其管控体系研究”(22GLC016)。

摘　　要：消费者使用在线平台时会留下隐私信息,是否应当收集消费者隐私并从中获利成为平台企业面临的重要问题。本文通过构建多阶段动态博弈模型,研究政府对隐私泄露施加惩罚的情况下在线平台的最优隐私收集策略。研究结果表明,如果不存在隐私泄露风险,在线平台总是选择收集消费者隐私,且“隐私占比”随着单位隐私价值递增,随着消费者隐私敏感度递减;相反,如果因为发生隐私泄露而遭受惩罚,则仅当惩罚力度较小时平台才有收集消费者隐私的动机。福利分析表明,当隐私泄露的惩罚相对较小时,收集消费者隐私是帕累托改进的。研究结果对于在线平台的隐私收集策略选择和利润来源的聚焦提供了一定的借鉴,也为相关部门制定隐私监管政策提供了参考。The collection of consumer privacy and its monetization have become important issues faced by online platform companies.This study constructs a multi-stage dynamic game model to investigate the optimal privacy collection strategies of online platforms under the condition that the government imposes penalties for privacy breaches.The research findings indicate that if there is no risk of privacy leakage,online platforms always choose to collect consumer privacy,and the"privacy share"increases with the unit value of privacy and decreases with consumer privacy sensitivity.On the other hand,if platforms face penalties due to privacy breaches,they are motivated to collect consumer privacy only when the severity of the penalties is relatively low.Welfare analysis shows that when the penalties for privacy breaches are relatively mild,collecting consumer privacy leads to Pareto improvement.The research results provide valuable insights for online platforms in terms of privacy collection strategy selection and profit generation and serve as a reference for relevant authorities in formulating privacy regulation policies.

关 键 词：在线平台 隐私收集 隐私泄露风险 隐私监管 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]