莱布尼茨论可能性、永恒真理与上帝存在的证明——对罗素批评性解释的反驳  

Leibniz on Possibility,Eternal Truth and the Proof of God's Existence——Rebuttal to Russell's Critical Interpretation

作　　者：任梓远 Ren Ziyuan

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《德国哲学》2023年第1期1-11,259,共12页Chinese Journal of German Philosophy

摘　　要：在《单子论》中,莱布尼茨声称他发现了一个新的有神论证明:倘若可能性和永恒真理中存在有实在性,那么这种实在性必然建立在某种现实性和存在上,并最终源自一个必然的存在者。罗素对此论证提出了质疑,他认为如果从矛盾律这种源初的永恒真理出发来推导上帝存在,我们就会陷入恶性循环。然而,这种判断建立在一个错误的原则之上,因此其结论也是不可靠的;罗素在阐释莱布尼茨哲学时,坚持以“同一性”为根本原则,而充足根据律从属于矛盾律。这种观点并不适用于莱布尼茨的模态理论,因为在应用于可能之物和永恒真理时,根据律并不是从属性原则,而是有其独立的地位。In Mononology Leibniz claimed that he found a new theistic proof:if there is reality in possibility and eternal truth,then this reality must be based on a certain reality and existence,and ultimately derived from a necessary being.Russell questioned this argu-ment,and he believed that the proof had fallen into a vicious circle.He believed that if we deduced the existence of God from the original truth,that is,the law of contradiction,we would fall into a vicious circle.However,this judgment is based on a incorrect principle,as consequence that the conclusion is trustless;Russell insists on“identity”as the fundamen-tal principle when he interprets Leibniz's philosophy,and the principle of sufficient reason is subordinate to the law of contradiction.This view does not apply to Leibniz's theory of possi-bility,because when applied to the possible,the principle of sufficient reason is not the subordinate,but has its own independent status.

关 键 词：模态 可能性 实在性 充足根据律 上帝存在 

分 类 号：B516.22[哲学宗教—外国哲学]