基于不完全信息视角下的社会“内卷”化现象博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Social“Involution”Phenomenon from the Perspective of Incomplete Information

作　　者：张左敏暘 冯鲍 ZHANG Zuominyang;FENG Bao(School of Economics,Guangxi University,Nanning 530004,China;Graduate School,Guangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanning 530003,China)

机构地区：[1]广西大学经济学院,广西南宁530004 [2]广西财经学院研究生院,广西南宁530003

出　　处：《重庆三峡学院学报》2024年第1期76-89,共14页Journal of Chongqing Three Gorges University

基　　金：广西哲学社会科学规划研究课题重点项目“重大公共卫生事件冲击下的广西地方金融风险防范化解研究”(20AJY001);广西研究生教育创新计划项目“新发展格局下数字产业链融合发展——基于组织重构视角”(YCSW2023069)。

摘　　要：近年来,“内卷”一词在学校与职场中频繁出现,“内卷”现象已成为现代社会中一个不可忽视的问题。基于演化博弈方法分别构建传统情况下与保障机制下社会内卷博弈模型,探究各参与主体的均衡选择,并进一步利用Matlab进行数值仿真。研究结果发现:(1)传统情况下,社会内卷博弈系统将朝着(卷,卷)的最劣稳定状态演化。随着时间的推移,整个社会处于一种爆炸式竞争的状态,这种状态很容易引发社会问题。(2)保障机制下,社会内卷博弈系统存在四种演化情况,当且仅当满足特定条件时,博弈系统会收敛到(不卷,不卷)的帕累托最优状态。总体来说,在信息不透明的情况下,竞争者为了将自己的生存概率最大化,会有意或无意地让所有参与者进入“内卷”状态,并且会自我加强、自我循环。In recent years,many contradictions and problems have arisen in the context of China’s market-oriented economic reforms,and the term“involution”has been frequently used in schools and workplaces.Consequently,the“involution”phenomenon has become an issue that cannot be ignored in modern society.This study utilizes an evolutionary game approach to construct social“involution”game models under both traditional conditions and safeguard mechanisms,exploring the equilibrium choices of various participating entities.Further,a numerical simulation is conducted using Matlab.Research findings reveal that:(1)Under traditional conditions,the social“involution”game system tends towards the worst stable state of(involution,involution).Over time,the entire society becomes embroiled in intense competition,and this competition easily leads to various social issues.(2)Under the safeguard mechanism,the social“involution”game system presents four evolutionary scenarios,and the game system will converge to the Pareto optimum state of(non-involution,non-involution)only under specific conditions.Overall,in a context of incomplete information,competitors,in order to maximize their survival prospects,consciously or unconsciously drive all participants into an“involution”state,resulting in self-intensification and self-reinforcement.To alleviate the“involution”problem,it is recommended to enhance information disclosure,continually improve institutional policies,design rational social security mechanisms,and guide competitors to recognize their comparative advantages,steering clear of the“herd effect”,and to seek paths of development that are in line with their own capabilities.

关 键 词：内卷 不完全信息 演化博弈 数值仿真 保障机制 

分 类 号：X171[环境科学与工程—环境科学]