平台引入自有产品对制造商质量披露策略的影响研究  

Impacts of E-Platform's Store-Brand Introduction on the Manufacturer's Quality Disclosure Strategy

作　　者：汤继武 孙燕红[1] 陈亚波 TANG Jiwu;SUN Yanhong;CHEN Yabo(SILC Business School,Shanghai University,Shanghai 201899)

机构地区：[1]上海大学悉尼工商学院,上海201899

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2023年第12期3206-3220,共15页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171142)资助课题.

摘　　要：制造商推出创新产品时,通常选择提前披露产品质量信息以降低市场对产品质量感知的不确定性.然而,电商平台引入自有产品改变了制造商与平台之间的合作关系,为平台供应链中制造商的质量信息披露决策带来新的挑战.文章旨在研究电商平台引入自有产品对制造商新产品质量披露策略以及供应链成员收益的影响.结果表明:1)当制造商的市场份额和披露成本较低时,平台引入自有产品会促使制造商披露更多的质量信息,提高供应链的信息透明度;反之,制造商选择披露更少的质量信息.2)制造商的质量披露阈值随平台的模仿能力呈倒“U”型变化.3)当制造商披露的产品质量低于某一水平时,平台引入自有产品将以损害制造商的利益为代价使自身受益;反之,平台引入自有产品将同时损害双方的收益.Manufacturers often disclose product quality information to reduce consumers'valuation uncertainty before launching innovative products.Nevertheless,introducing store brand by e-platforms has changed the cooperation between manufacturers and platforms.This paper investigates the impacts of the platform's store-brand introduction on the manufacturer's quality disclosure strategy and the profitability of supply chain members.The results show that:1)If the manufacturer's market share and disclosure cost are both relatively low,the platform's store-brand introduction will induce the manufacturer to disclose more quality information and improve the information transparency in the supply chain;otherwise,the platform's store-brand introduction will lead the manufacturer to disclose less quality information.2)The manufacturer's quality disclosure threshold varies in an inverted“U”shape with the platform's imitation capability.3)If the manufacturer's product quality is lower than a particular level,the platform's store-brand introduction will benefit himself but hurt the manufacturer;otherwise,the platform's store-brand introduction will hurt the profitability of both parties.

关 键 词：平台供应链 质量信息披露 平台入侵 自有产品 竞争 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F724.6[经济管理—国民经济]