基于随机演化博弈的工业互联网平台建设策略研究  

Research on Construction Strategy of Industrial Internet Platform Based on Stochastic Evolutionary Game

作　　者：骆建彬 朱海鹏[1] LUO Jianbin;ZHU Haipeng(School of Business,Guangdong Polytechnic of Science and Technology,Zhuhai 519090,Guangdong,China)

机构地区：[1]广东科学技术职业学院商学院,广东珠海519090

出　　处：《科技和产业》2024年第1期220-230,共11页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金(2020A1515010971);广科物流协同创新中心项目(K01057061);广东省教育厅“数据分析技术与应用研究创新团队”项目(2023WCXTDO33)。

摘　　要：工业互联网平台存在的高门槛及复杂的应用场景决定了工业互联网平台与消费互联网平台之间建设模式的巨大差异。当前龙头企业主导的工业互联网平台建设模式存在不足。提出“政府引导-平台提供者牵头-中小制造企业协作”的工业互联网平台建设模式,并构建政府、平台提供者、中小制造企业三方随机演化博弈模型,分析各方在建设工业互联网平台时的策略选择。研究发现:外界不确定因素只会对平台提供者和中小制造企业的决策策略造成影响,政府的决策结果不受干扰;政府决策不受初始支持意愿影响,都将选择支持建设工业互联网平台,而平台提供者以及中小制造企业的决策受彼此的意愿正向影响;平台提供者的决策对政府的政策支持更加敏感,中小制造企业决策对政府的资金支持和惩罚力度更为敏感;成本分配系数增大或减小对于中小制造企业和平台提供者具有相反的影响。The high threshold and complex application scenarios of industrial Internet platforms determines the huge difference in construction models between industrial Internet platforms and consumer internet platforms.The current industrial internet platform construction model dominated by leading enterprises has shortcomings.The industrial internet platform construction model of“government guidance-platform provider-led-small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises cooperation”are proposed,and a tripartite random evolutionary game model of government,platform providers,and small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises is constructed to analyze the construction of industrial Internet platforms by all parties time strategy choices.It is found that external uncertainties will only affect the decision-making strategies of platform providers and small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises,and the government’s decision-making results will not be disturbed.Government decision-making is not affected by the initial support willingness,and will choose to support the construction of the industrial internet platform,while the decision-making of platform providers and small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises is positively affected by each other’s willingness.The decision-making of platform providers is more sensitive to the government’s policy support,and the decision-making of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises is more sensitive to the government’s financial support and punishment.The increase or decrease of the cost allocation coefficient has the opposite effect on SMEs and platform providers.

关 键 词：工业互联网平台 制造业 中小企业 随机演化博弈 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]