制造商公平关切下的供应链契约协调研究  

Coordination contract of supply chain under manufacturer's fairness concern

作　　者：曹凯 吉清凯 赵达[1,2] 胡祥培 CAO Kai;JI Qingkai;ZHAO Da;HU Xiangpei(International Business School,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China;Hainan Institute of Corporate Governance,Haikou 570228,China;School of Economics and Management,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China)

机构地区：[1]海南大学国际商学院,海南海口570228 [2]海南省公司治理研究院,海南海口570228 [3]大连理工大学经济与管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2024年第1期369-378,共10页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72061009,71701057);海南省自然科学基金资助项目(723MS028,2019RC124)。

摘　　要：针对制造商公平关切下的二级供应链,构建非合作博弈模型,考察批发价契约与收益共享契约的供应链协调功能。通过逆向归纳求解博弈均衡,分析发现:与零售商公平关切时不同,制造商公平关切时批发价契约总是无法协调供应链,制造商将利用其先动优势使得自己总是处于优势不公平(即其利润总大于零售商);当市场潜在需求足够大,且制造商的优势不公平感知足够强时,若令收益共享率为1/2,且制造商以成本价供货,则该收益共享契约可实现供应链协调。Considering a dyadic supply chain under the manufacturer's fairness concern,a non-cooperative game model was constructed to investigate the coordination function of wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract.The game equilibrium was solved by backward induction.It was found that the wholesale price contract was always unable to coordinate the supply chain under the manufacturer's fairness concern,which was different from the result under retailer's fairness concern.The manufacturer would leverage the first-mover advantage to ensure an advantageous inequality(the manufacturer profit is always greater than the retailer's).When the potential demand was large and the manufacturer's disutility from advantageous inequity was strong,the revenue sharing contract could achieve supply chain coordination if the sharing rate was 1/2 and the manufacturer supplied at the cost price.

关 键 词：公平关切 批发价 收益共享 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]