股权激励对国企创新投入的影响研究——基于混合所有制改革背景  

Research on the impact of equity incentive on innovation investment of state-owned enterprises:based on the background of mixed ownership reform

作　　者：冯旭日[1] 丛颖 郑毅 FENG Xuri;CONG Ying;ZHENG Yi(School of Business Administration,Liaoning Technical University,Huludao 125105,China;School of Accounting and Finance,Beijing Institute of Technology Zhuhai,Zhuhai 519088,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院,辽宁葫芦岛125105 [2]北京理工大学珠海学院会计与金融学院,广东珠海519088

出　　处：《辽宁工程技术大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第1期15-23,共9页Journal of Liaoning Technical University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(12YJC630071)。

摘　　要：选取2014—2019年沪深混改国企为研究样本,实证检验高管和核心技术及业务人员股权激励与企业创新投入的关系。结果表明:非国有股权制衡在影响高管股权激励促进创新投入的作用上表现为双重调节效应,在地方国企中更为明显。高管政治晋升激励对高管股权激励与创新投入关系的影响因国企层级而不同,在地方混改国企表现为正向调节效应,在混改央企表现为负向调节效应。研究结论为高管股权激励通过公司治理渠道影响企业创新提供了证据。Based on the data of mixed reform state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2019,empirical analysis found that equity incentives for senior executives,core technology and business personnel have significantly improved the innovation investment level of state-owned enterprises.The research results show that:non-state-owned equity checks and balances have a dual regulatory effect on the impact of executive equity incentive on innovation investment,especially in local state-owned enterprises.The impact of political promotion incentive on the relationship between equity incentive and innovation investment varies with the level of state-owned enterprises.In local mixed reform state-owned enterprises,it shows a positive regulatory effect,and in mixed reform central enterprises,it shows a negative regulatory effect.This study provides evidence that executive equity incentive affects enterprise innovation through corporate governance channels.

关 键 词：股权激励 创新投入 混合所有制改革 非国有股权制衡 公司治理 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]