理性主义在戴维森哲学中的核心作用  

The Central Role of Rationalism in Davidson's Philosophy

作　　者：叶闯 Ye Chuang(School of Philosophy,Shanxi University,Hangzhou 310058)

机构地区：[1]山西大学哲学学院,太原030006

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2024年第2期108-116,159,共10页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目“计算机产生的虚拟现实的本体论和语言哲学研究”(项目编号:23AZX019)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：在语言哲学等领域,戴维森与奎因在一些问题上得出了看起来一致的结论。但是,在这些一致结论背后可能存在的哲学基础的不同,需要给予充分注意。应该看到,由于戴维森的基本哲学倾向是理性主义的,故他在考虑语言理解问题时,是从理性原则出发的。因此,用作自然语言语义模式的塔尔斯基式的真理论、看起来与奎因一致的整体论和善意原则等,都应该被理解为理性原则,而不是奎因意义上的经验认知的助发现原则。重要的是,戴维森哲学作为一种理性主义哲学,并不完全是传统意义上的,它强调交流者间共享的因果环境,强调外在对象作为语句和信念的内容,并把此种语言和认知的外在主义整合进理性主义的体系之中,从而避免了传统理性主义的一些困难。Within the domain of language philosophy and beyond,Davidson and Quine converge on seemingly identical conclusions regarding certain queries.Yet,the philosophical underpinnings diverging beneath these consensual outcomes warrant meticulous attention.It emerges that Davidson's philosophical stance is fundamentally rooted in rationalism,guiding his inquiry into language comprehension from a rationalist perspective.Thus,constructs such as the Tarskian truth theory as a semantic model for natural language,alongside notions seemingly in alignment with Quine—holism and the principle of charity—are to be interpreted through the lens of rational principles rather than as empirical heuristic principles in Quine's context.Importantly,Davidson's philosophy,as a form of rationalism,is not entirely traditional.It emphasizes the shared causal environment among speakers,highlights external objects as the content of statements and beliefs,and integrates this externalism of language and cognition into the system of rationalism,thereby avoiding some of the difficulties of traditional rationalism.

关 键 词：语义解释 戴维森 奎因 理性主义 

分 类 号：H0-05[语言文字—语言学] B712.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]