共同机构投资者与管理者短视  

Common Institutional Investor and Managerial Myopia

作　　者：王新光 盛宇华[1] WANG Xin-guang;SHENG Yu-hua(School of Business,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023)

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学商学院,南京210023

出　　处：《软科学》2024年第1期124-131,共8页Soft Science

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学基金项目(20BGL139)。

摘　　要：在理论分析共同机构投资者影响管理者短视行为内在机理的基础上,系统考察了二者之间的影响机制与边界条件。结果表明,共同机构投资者抑制了管理者短视,支持了协同治理假说。机制分析表明,共同机构投资者对管理者短视的抑制作用主要通过监督效应和协同效应实现。进一步地,在行业层面与企业层面的异质性检验表明,共同机构投资者对管理者短视的抑制作用在行业竞争优势与独立董事网络中心度较低情境下更为显著。Based on theoretical analysis of the underlying mechanism of common institutional investors'influence on manag-erial myopia,the influence mechanism and boundary conditions between the two are systematically examined.The results in-dicate that common institutional investors inhibit managerial myopia and support the synergistic governance hypothesis.The mechanism analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of common institutional investors on managerial myopia is mainly realized through the monitoring effect and synergistic effect.Further,industry-level and firm-level heterogeneity tests suggest that the inhibitory effect of common institutional investors on managerial myopia is more pronounced in the context of low industry competitive advantage and independent director network centrality.

关 键 词：共同机构投资者 管理者短视 协同治理假说 行业竞争 独立董事网络中心度 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济] F275