混合所有制改革与国有企业债务违约风险的防范  

MIXED OWNERSHIP REFORM AND THE PREVENTION OF DEBT DEFAULT RISK IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

作　　者：胡玥 马新啸 郑国坚[4] HU Yue;MA Xinxiao;ZHENG Guojian(School of Finance,Nanjing Audit University;Management College,China Business Working Capital Management Research Center,Ocean University of China;School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学金融学院,211815 [2]中国海洋大学管理学院 [3]中国企业营运资金管理研究中心 [4]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2023年第12期32-47,共16页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：山东省社会科学规划研究项目“国有产权权利束分割赋能山东国企高质量发展研究”(23DJJJ26)的资助。

摘　　要：本文以非国有股东参与治理为切入点,研究国有企业混合所有制改革对其债务违约风险的影响。研究发现,非国有股东参与国企高层治理能够在缓解国有企业政策性负担的同时抑制管理层私利行为,从而显著降低债务违约风险。进一步研究发现,非国有股东通过派出董事参与董事会会议、更有效地行使股东权利等方式来实现其治理效应,但是该效应受国企管理层权力的影响。最后,非国有股东派出董事参与治理对债务违约风险的防范作用在外部制度环境较好、地方控制的国有企业中更为突出。This paper takes the participation of non-state shareholders in governance as the starting point to research the impact of mixed ownership reform in SOEs on their debt default risk.The results show that non-state shareholders participate in high-level governance of SOEs can alleviate the policy burden of SOEs and suppress management's selfish behavior,thereby significantly reducing the risk of debt default.Further research finds that non-state shareholders can achieve their governance effects by dispatching directors to participate in board meetings and exercising shareholder rights more effectively,but the above governance effect is influenced by the power of management of SOEs.Finally,this effect is more effective in SOEs in better external institutional environments and in locally controlled SOEs.

关 键 词：国有企业 债务违约风险 混合所有制改革 非国有股东派出董事参与治理 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F275