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作 者:夏德建 王勇[2] Xia Dejian;Wang Yong
出 处:《工程经济》2023年第11期17-28,共12页ENGINEERING ECONOMY
基 金:重庆师范大学博士启动项目“制造商与电商平台的分销渠道竞合博弈”(项目编号:22XWB004)。
摘 要:针对自营型电商平台入侵线下渠道带来的实体商横向公平关切问题,本文对电商平台和实体商的多渠道分销定价博弈及其影响进行了分析。通过对比“实体商表现为公平中性”、“平台不关注实体商的公平关切”和“平台关注实体商的公平关切”等三个模型的博弈均衡发现:当实体商表现为公平中性时,平台与实体商的定价最高、需求最低,但双方利润均最高。当实体商表达公平关切时,实体商的公平关切定价会促使双方陷入以低价争夺客户的“价格战”之中,进而导致双输局面。通过敏感性分析还发现,双方利润会因实体商公平关切程度的加深而恶化。总之,在电商平台的渠道入侵下,实体商的公平关切将造成供应链网络定价的恶性竞争和系统效益损失。In response to the horizontal fairness concerns of physical merchant caused by the encroachment of e-commerce plat-form into offline channel,this article analyzes the multi-channel pricing game between a self operated e-commerce platform and a physical merchant.By comparing the game equilibrias of three models,namely"the physical merchant shows fairness neutrali-ty","the platform does not pay attention to the fairness concerns of the physical merchant",and"the platform focuses on the fairness concerns of the physical merchant",it is found that when the physical merchant is fairness neutrality,the platform and the physical merchant have the highest prices and lowest demands,but both parties have the highest profits.When the physical merchant expresses concerns about fairness,the fair pricing can lead to a"price war"where both parties compete for customers at low prices,resulting in a double loss situation.Through sensitivity analysis,it was also found that the profits of both parties will deteriorate due to the deepening concern for fairness of the physical merchant.In short,under the channel encroachment of the e-commerce platform,the fairness concerns of the physical merchant will lead to vicious competition in supply chain network pricing and loss of system benefits.
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