生命尊严与法律权利范围的扩展  

The Dignity of Life and the Expansion of Legal Rights

作　　者：朱振 Zhu Zhen

机构地区：[1]吉林大学理论法学研究中心

出　　处：《江海学刊》2024年第1期168-175,256,共9页Jianghai Academic Journal

基　　金：吉林大学“新文科”创新团队项目“生物技术应用人体的伦理与法律问题研究”(项目号:2021XWK05)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：尊严一开始是一个代表等级的概念,也不对应权利,后来才悖论性地被扩展适用于所有的人。以尊严的传统范式/现代范式为参照点,可以看到,支配着法律制度和价值体系的康德尊严理论解释力不足,有必要在现代范式下发展康德的尊严理论,以回应生命科技对尊严的内在挑战。尊严理论需要更进一步普遍化,需要将尊严的涵摄范围扩张到超越时间的“人的生命”。因此,对人性尊严的关注点应当从受到时间限制的“人”转向“人的生命”,界定“人的生命的尊严”的内涵,并以之为根据在法哲学上辩护人的各种生命形态所具有的规范性意义,从而为赋予其权利奠定理论基础。Dignity was initially a concept representing hierarchy and did not correspond to rights, but later paradoxically extended to all people. Taking the traditional/modern paradigm of dignity as a reference point, Kant’s theory of dignity, which dominates the legal institutions and value systems, lacks explanatory power. It is necessary to develop Kant’s theory of dignity under the modern paradigm to respond to the inherent challenges of biotechnology to dignity. The theory of dignity needs to be further generalized, expanding the scope of dignity to encompass “human life” beyond time. Therefore, the focus on human dignity should shift from “human being” constrained by time to “human life”, define the connotation of “the dignity of human life”, and use it as a basis to defend the normative significance of various forms of human life in legal philosophy, and thus lay a theoretical foundation for granting them rights.

关 键 词：人性尊严 生命 主体 权利 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]