信念-愿望-意图逻辑的哲学基础  

The Philosophical Basis for Belief-Desire-Intention Logic

作　　者：郝一江[1] HAO Yijiang(Institute of Philosophy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院哲学所,北京100732

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第1期33-40,共8页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(22FZXB092);中国社会科学院哲学研究所创新工程项目(2024ZXSCX06)。

摘　　要：从常识性心理学、心灵哲学和行为哲学的视角,系统探讨意图、信念、愿望、规划与Agent实践推理的关系,可得到如下主要观点:(1)意图既是潜在的行为影响者,又是行为控制者,它为进一步的实践推理和规划提供了重要的输入。(2)意图涉及承诺;规划揭示了“以实践推理为中心的承诺的重要属性”;资源受限Agent的规划通常是具有层级结构的局部规划;意图是规划和实践推理得以关联的关键因素。(3)规划支持协调,并能够扩大慎思对之后行为的影响。(4)意图不仅能够帮助实践推理确定选项的相关性和可接受性,而且还能够构建“权衡愿望-信念理由”的过程。From the perspectives of common sense psychology,philosophy of mind,and behavioral philosophy,a systematic exploration of the relationships between/among intentions,beliefs,desires,plans,and agent practical reasoning can lead to the following main viewpoints:(1)Intentions are not only potential conduct influencers,but also conduct controllers,and they provide crucial inputs for further practical reasoning and planning;(2)Intentions involve commitments.Plans reveal the important properties that are crucial to an understanding of reasoning-centered commitments.The plans of a resource-bounded rational agent are typically partial and have a hierarchical structure.Intentions are key factors in linking planning and practical reasoning.(3)Plans support coordination and systematically extend the influence of deliberation on later conduct,and(4)Intentions not only help to determine the relevance and admissibility of options through practical reasoning,but also structure the process of weighing desire-belief reasons.

关 键 词：信念 愿望 意图 规划 Agent实践推理 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]