从众效应下建筑施工安全激励机制演化博弈研究  

Study on evolutionary game of incentive mechanism for construction safety under herd effect

作　　者：邹林佳 张静[1] ZOU Linjia;ZHANG Jing(School of Economics and Management,SouthWest JiaoTong University,Chengdu Sichuan 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《中国安全生产科学技术》2024年第2期138-144,共7页Journal of Safety Science and Technology

基　　金：四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地“社会发展与社会风险控制研究中心”2020年度课题(SR20A16);四川应用心理学研究中心科研项目(CSXL-182006)。

摘　　要：为有效提高建筑施工安全系数、降低安全事故发生率,结合建筑施工领域以及建筑工人群体结构特点,基于从众心理和激励机制构建管理者和建筑工人安全行为监管演化博弈模型,并采用数值仿真法分析从众效应对激励机制作用效果的影响。研究结果表明:激励机制作用效果与从众效应强度、从众效应价值显著相关;正负向激励措施对从众效应下的工人积极安全行为均有正向促进作用,正向激励效果更显著;激励机制作用效果在不同从众效应强度和从众效应价值组合下变化,根据具体情况及时调整激励力度可达到激励机制作用最大化、利益最大化的效果。研究结果可为制定更加合理有效的建筑施工安全激励机制提供理论依据。In order to effectively improve the safety factor of construction and reduce the incidence of safety accidents,combined with the characteristics of construction field and construction workers group structure,an evolutionary game model on the safety behavior supervision of managers and construction workers was constructed based on the herd psychology and the incentive mechanism,and the numerical simulation was used to analyze the influence of the herd effect on the incentive mechanism.The results show that the effect of incentive mechanism is significantly related to the strength and value of herd effect.Both the positive and negative incentive measures have positive promotion effect on the positive safety behavior of workers under the herd effect,and the positive incentive effect is more significant.The effect of incentive mechanism changes under different strength and value combination of herd effect.The effect of incentive mechanism maximization and benefit maximization can be achieved by adjusting the intensity of incentive measures in time according to specific circumstances.The results provide a theoretical basis for developing a more reasonable and effective construction safety incentive mechanism.

关 键 词：施工安全 从众效应 激励机制 演化博弈 

分 类 号：X947[环境科学与工程—安全科学]