环境监管强化与企业研发投资:倒逼效应抑或挤出效应  

Strengthening of Environmental Supervision and Firm R&D Investment:Anti-driving Effect or Crowding-out Effect

作　　者：林飞腾 金戈 LIN Feiteng;JIN Ge(School of Public Finance and Taxation,Zhejiang University of Finance&Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学财政税务学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《财经论丛》2024年第2期59-69,共11页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72073116,72002190)。

摘　　要：本文基于重点排污单位名录管理规定,以2016—2020年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,考察了强化环境监管对企业研发投资行为的影响及作用机制。研究发现,环境监管对企业研发投资存在显著的挤出效应,并涉及绿色研发投资。其中,融资压力和业绩压力是环境监管对企业研发投资产生挤出效应的两条潜在作用机制。异质性分析表明,环境监管对企业研发投资的挤出效应会在非国有控股企业、非重污染行业和地区环境监管水平较高的样本中更为明显。进一步的研究发现,环境监管对企业研发投资的挤出效应损害了企业价值。With the rapid economic development,environmental pollution issues have become increasingly significant.In order to solve severe pollution issues,governments have made a vast array of environmental regulatory policies to limit pollution emissions.In China,as an important means of daily environmental supervision,the Key Emission Unit List Management Regulation aims to strengthen environmental supervision of heavily polluting enterprises and curb their polluting behaviors through vertical supervision at the central and provincial levels,as well as parallel local regulation.Currently,the impact of environmental regulations on firms’R&D behavior has become a focus of academic attention.According to the Porter hypothesis,environmental supervision can stimulate firms’R&D investment,while according to the view of neoclassical economists,environmental supervision will crowd out firms’R&D investment.Based on the Key Emission Unit List Management Regulation,this paper examines the impact of environmental supervision on corporate R&D investment and its influence mechanism using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2020.The results show that the enhanced environmental supervision has a significant crowding-out effect on corporate R&D investment,including environmentally-friendly R&D investment.A series of robustness tests justify our findings.Mechanism tests indicate that financing pressure and performance pressure are two potential mechanisms by which environmental supervision crowds out corporate R&D investment.On the one hand,environmental supervision increases the financing pressure of the firm,which reduces the resources of enterprises for innovation.On the other hand,environmental supervision puts performance pressure on executives,which reduces management's willingness to innovate.The heterogeneity results reveal that the crowding-out effect of environmental regulation on corporate R&D investment is more significant in non-state-controlled enterprises,non-heavy-polluting industries,and samples

关 键 词：环境监管 研发投资 挤出效应 融资压力 业绩压力 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]