高管纵向兼任对国有企业创新绩效的影响——以风险承担为中介  

The Impact of Vertical Interlock on Innovation Performance of State-owned Enterprises:The Mediating Role of Risk-taking

作　　者：黄卫华[1,2] 鲁姝桦 孙凯 HUANG Weihua;LU Shuhua;SUN Kai(School of Management,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China;China Institute of Regulation and Public Policy Research,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou,310018,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江财经大学中国政府监管与公共政策研究院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《财经论丛》2024年第2期91-101,共11页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：浙江省社科重大项目(22YJRC09ZD);国家自然科学基金项目(72072156)。

摘　　要：高管纵向兼任现象在我国国有企业中普遍存在,对企业经营管理和投资决策均产生直接影响。本文基于代理问题和最优契约理论,以2013—2020年中国A股国有企业为样本,研究高管纵向兼任对国有企业创新绩效的作用机制。结果表明:高管纵向兼任对国有企业创新绩效有正向影响;风险承担在高管纵向兼任与国有企业创新绩效的关系中发挥中介作用;信息披露质量以风险承担为中介在高管纵向兼任与国有企业创新绩效的关系中起正向调节作用;高管薪酬粘性以风险承担为中介在高管纵向兼任与国有企业创新绩效的关系中起负向调节作用。本文引入信息披露质量和高管薪酬粘性作为调节变量,拓展了高管纵向兼任与企业创新绩效关系的研究,并为设计国有企业的信息披露制度以及高管人员的薪酬契约制度提供实践指导。The phenomenon of vertical interlock is common among state-owned enterprises(SOEs)in China and has a direct impact on both business management and investment decisions.Based on the agency problem and optimal contract theory,this paper investigates the impact of vertical interlock on the innovation performance of SOEs.The empirical findings show that vertical interlock has a positive impact on SOEs'innovation performance;and risk-taking plays a mediating role in the relationship between vertical interlock and SOEs'innovation performance.Information disclosure quality plays a positive moderating role in the relationship of vertical interlock and SOEs'innovation performance through mediating role of risk-taking.Executive compensation stickiness plays a negative moderating role in the relationship of vertical interlock and SOEs'innovation performance through mediating role of risk-taking.By introducing information disclosure quality and executive compensation stickiness as moderating variables this paper will not only enrich the research on the relationship between vertical interlock and innovation performance of SOEs,but also provide some practical insights for designing information closure and executive compensation contract system of SOE executives.

关 键 词：高管纵向兼任 风险承担 创新绩效 信息披露质量 高管薪酬粘性 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]