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作 者:贾丽艳 JIA Liyan(School of Arts and Communication,China Women’s University,Beijing 100101,China)
机构地区:[1]中华女子学院文化传播与艺术学院,北京100101
出 处:《同济大学学报(社会科学版)》2024年第1期24-31,共8页Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition
摘 要:传统哲学以存在论为基础,其存在论只关注已有存在和永恒存在,不讨论甚至排斥尚未存在和可能存在,因此传统哲学从来是缺乏未来向度的,未来可能的问题因而没有进入哲学的议事日程。布洛赫的希望存在论一反传统哲学的实在存在论,他使“希望”从一种意愿表达变成了一个存在范畴。“希望”不仅是存在的,而且还是推动存在的;“希望”不仅是主观的,而且是客观的。这是因为“希望”表达了一种有待实现的未来可能性。布洛赫的希望存在论立足于乌托邦精神以及出现在人类历史上的各式各样的乌托邦设计,在哲学史上第一次开创性地提出了一种关于未来可能的哲学证明。这种希望存在论尝试将“希望”置入主客观的会通之中,对于乌托邦给出了一种创新性的解释,既别开生面地改造了哲学,也不可避免地留下了其哲学证明上的杂糅性问题。Traditional philosophy,rooted in the theory of existence,focuses solely on existing existence and eternal existence,neglecting or even excluding the yet-to-exist and possible existence.Consequently,traditional philosophy has always lacked a future dimension,and the possible problems of the future have not entered the agenda of philosophy.Bloch’s existential theory of hope is contrary to the actual ontology of traditional philosophy by transforming“hope”from an expression of will into a category of existence.“Hope”not only exists,but also drives existence;“hope”is not only subjective but also objective.Because“hope”expresses a future possibility to be realized.Bloch’s existential theory of hope is based on the utopian spirit and the various utopian designs that have appeared in human history.For the first time in the history of philosophy,it pioneered a philosophical proof of the possibility of the future.This existential theory of hope attempt to place hope in the intersection of subjectivity and objectivity gives an innovative interpretation of utopia,which not only transforms philosophy in a unique way but also inevitably leaves behind the problem of hybridity in its philosophical proofs.
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