不同权力结构下供应链外包减排微分博弈研究  

Differential Game Research on Emission Reduction of Supply Chain Outsourcing under Different Power Structures

作　　者：徐登凯 张桂涛 王志远 XU Deng-kai;ZHANG Gui-tao;WANG Zhi-yuan(Business School,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266061,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,青岛266061

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2023年第4期84-91,共8页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(批准号:19BGL091)资助。

摘　　要：为了探究低碳服务提供商对供应链碳减排的影响,构建了由制造商与低碳服务提供商构成的二级供应链微分博弈模型,得到了不同权力结构下的最优定价决策,通过数值算例分析探究各因素对碳减排量和供应链利润的影响。研究结果表明,供应链成员权力不对等会降低供应链总利润,供应链权力的转移会影响低碳服务提供商进行碳减排研发投入的积极性。碳交易共享比例是制造商在不对等权力决策中利润大小的关键,制造商应在碳交易收益上让利给低碳服务提供商,以获取更大的经济效益和环境效益。In order to explore the influence of low-carbon service providers on carbon emission reduction in the supply chain,a two-level supply chain differential game model consisting of manufacturers and low-carbon service providers was constructed,and the optimal pricing decisions under different power structures were obtained.The influence of various influencing factors on carbon emission reduction and supply chain profit was analyzed by numerical examples.The results show that the power imbalance of supply chain members reduces the total profit of supply chain,and the transfer of supply chain power affects the enthusiasm of low-carbon service providers in carbon emission reduction investment and research and development.Carbon trading sharing ratio is the key to the profit of manufacturers in unequal power decision-making.Manufacturers should yield profits from carbon trading to low-carbon service providers in order to obtain greater economic and environmental benefits.

关 键 词：低碳供应链 碳交易 外包减排 不同权力结构 碳交易收益共享 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]