橘枳之辩:新旧“一肩挑”与国有企业研发效率——来自中国A股国有企业的经验证据  

New and Old CEO Duality and R&D Efficiency of State-owned Enterprises:Evidence from Chinese A-share SOEs

作　　者：范明珠 王京[1] 徐璟娜[1] Fan Mingzhu;Wang Jing;Xu Jingna(College of Management,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China)

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学管理学院,山东青岛266100

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2024年第5期30-39,共10页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划项目(18YJC630178);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2022QG028)。

摘　　要：选取2008—2020年沪深两市A股国有企业作为样本进行实证分析,考察新“一肩挑”(董事长兼任党委书记)与旧“一肩挑”(董事长兼任总经理)对企业研发效率的影响差异,分析二者关系的作用机理,并探讨经济政策不确定性与企业风险承担能力的异质性影响。研究结果表明:与旧“一肩挑”相比,新“一肩挑”会显著提高企业研发效率,具体而言,可以通过优化国有企业经营效率和董事会治理效率提升企业研发效率;在经济政策不确定性较高和风险承担能力较低的国有企业中,新“一肩挑”对企业研发效率的正向作用更显著;新“一肩挑”通过提高企业研发效率提升企业价值,且该提升作用具有持续性。R&D efficiency is an important factor for enterprises to gain competitive advantages and achieve high quality growth.With the implementation of the national innovation strategy,the proportion of R&D in China's GDP has been increasing,and has reached the level of the advanced countries in Europe and the United States.However,compared with the world's major innovative countries,the R&D efficiency of Chinese enterprises is still at a low level.In particular,the loss of R&D efficiency of state-owned enterprises is still greater than that of non-state-owned enterprises,which arouses scholars'attention to the design of internal system and governance structure.Managers,as the main participants and actual operators of enterprise decisions,are the key to improving the efficiency of enterprise R&D.Corporate leadership structure and its differences are also important factors affecting the allocation of managers'power and decision-making choices.As a specific leadership structure,the dual position of being both the chairman of the board and CEO will have a direct impact on the long-term development of enterprises.Different from the corporate governance structure in Europe and America,China has a unique corporate governance framework.As the core of the Party committee and the board of directors of enterprises,the CEO duality leadership configuration between the Party secretary and the chairman of the board of directors can regulate the management behavior from the source and alleviate the agency problem of state-owned enterprises.However there is little literature on the influences of the new CEO duality leadership structure of being chairman and Party secretary on enterprise R&D efficiency.Therefore,this paper takes the A-share state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 as samples for empirical analysis,examines the difference between the influence of the new structure(duality of secretary of the Party committee and chairman of the board)and the old one(duality of chairman of the board and CEO)on the

关 键 词：研发效率 党组织建设 企业领导权结构 国有企业 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]