多任务委托视角下政府引导基金参股子基金激励机制研究  

A Study on Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capital Fund Sponsored by Government Guide Fund from the Perspective of Multi-Task Principal-Agent

作　　者：王斌 WANG Bin(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2024年第1期236-245,共10页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：通过设计政府引导基金参股子基金的多任务激励机制能引导代理人合理分配努力投入,有利于实现政策目标和提高引导基金的收益.将影响激励机制设计的参数,包括任务重要程度、投入成本和绩效波动系数植入多任务委托代理模型,构建面向基金管理机构的多任务激励契约.研究发现:1)在两项任务关联和无关联的情形下,对某项任务的最优激励强度随该任务重要程度的增加而增强,随投入成本和绩效波动系数的增加而减弱;2)当两项任务无关联时,某项任务的参数发生改变不影响委托人对另一项任务的激励;在两项任务关联的情形下,当某项任务的参数发生改变时需要调整另一项任务的激励强度.在两项任务的关联属性分别为互补性和替代性的情况下进行调整的方向是相反的;3)提高任务的可观测性或降低代理人的投入成本可提高激励的强度,诱导代理人增加对任务的投入,有利于促进政策目标的实现和基金综合绩效的提升.By designing a multi-task oriented incentive mechanism for sub-fund sponsored by government guide fund can guide agents to allocate their effort they put into the two tasks reasonably,which is conducive to achieving policy goals and to improving the returns of gov-ernment guide fund.In this paper,a multi-task oriented incentive contract for fund manager is constructed by implanting the parameters that affect the design of incentive mechanisms,including weight of the task,effort cost coefficient,and performance volatility coefficient into the multi-task principal-agent model.Results show that:1)Whether two tasks are inter-dependent and independent,the optimal incentive level for a given task increases with the increase of the weight of the task,but decreases with the increase of the effort cost coefficient and performance volatility coefficient;2)When the two tasks are independent,a change in the parameters of one task does not affect the incentive level for another task.In the case where two tasks are interdependent,the optimal incentive level for another task should be adjusted when the parameters related to a given task change.Moreover,in the two different situations of the two tasks are complementarity and substitutive,The direction of adjusting incentive level for another task caused by changes of parameters related to a given task is opposite;3)By improving the observability or task or reducing the effort cost of agent,im-prove level can be increased.This will induce agent to put more effort into task,which is beneficial for promoting the achievement of policy goal and the improvement of the overall performance of the fund.

关 键 词：政府引导基金 多任务委托代理 激励机制 任务关联性 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]