考虑内部人吹哨的产品质量监管四方演化博弈  

Four-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of Product Quality Regulation Considering Internal Employee's Participation

作　　者：赵哲耘 刘玉敏[3] 梁晓莹 王宁[3] Zhao Zheyun;Liu Yumin;Liang Xiaoying;Wang Ning(Department of Planning and Discipline Development,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;International Institution for Quality Development,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;School of Business,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州大学规划与学科建设部,河南郑州450001 [2]郑州大学国际质量发展研究院,河南郑州450001 [3]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第2期43-53,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(U1904211);河南省科技攻关项目(212102210053);河南省高等学校青年骨干教师培养项目(2021GGJS006);河南省高校科技创新人才支持计划(22HASTIT022);郑州大学精尖学科支持项目(XKLMJX202201)。

摘　　要：已有的产品质量监管研究多关注政府等外部监管主体,缺乏对企业内部监管资源的发掘。鉴于内部人在产品质量监管中发挥的重要作用,构建了公众参与下政府、企业、媒体和内部人的四方演化博弈模型,探讨了内部人吹哨行为对产品质量监管的影响。研究结果表明,内部人参与监管是对以政府为主体的外部监管体系的有益补充,在一定程度上缓解了由信息不对称造成的政府监管效能低下的问题;吹哨人保护和奖励制度影响内部人的举报策略;内部人吹哨能否发挥对企业和政府的补充作用,不仅受到政治问责力度和对违法生产处罚力度的影响,还会受到媒体是否介入的影响。最后,结合长生疫苗案例,阐述了产品质量监管中内部人吹哨对企业和政府策略选择的影响路径。Internal employee plays an increasing role in the recent practice of product quality regulation,such as carcinogenic Three Squirrels,inferior masks and kit during the period of COVID-19,Changsheng Vaccine incident,et al.Existing researches focused on the product quality supervision system comprised of government regulation,enterprise self-discipline and media supervision,which ignore the role of internal employee.Based on previous studies,a new regulation subject,internal employee or whistle-blower,is introduced.Then the evolutionary game model comprised of employee,government,enterprise,media and the public is constructed to analyze the effect of employee whistle-blowing on product quality regulation.The results show that employee participation is a beneficial supplement to external quality regulation subjects dominated by the government,which alleviates the low efficiency of government regulation caused by information asymmetry and limited regulation resources.Whistle-blower protection and reward system are the main factors jointly affecting employee’s strategy selection.Whether an employee’s whistle-blowing can play a supervisory role over enterprises and governments is not only influenced by government accountability and enterprise punishment,but also by whether report information is concerned by the media and the public.Finally,he important influence of whistle-blower on the strategy selection of enterprises and government is analyzed through combining the case of the Changsheng Vaccine incident.The interactive mechanism among potential whistle-blower,media,govern‐ment,enterprise and the public is studied under the scenario of product quality regulation,which enriched the study of internal employee in product regulation.Besides,this research can be further extended to other areas,such as financial regulation,et al.

关 键 词：产品质量监管 内部人 吹哨 四方演化博弈 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济] C931[经济管理—管理学]