复杂产品研发网络中企业技术创新行为动态演化研究  

Evolutionary Game on Technological Innovation of Enterprises in Complex Product R&D Network

作　　者：杨乃定[1] 王郁 王琰 张延禄[1] Yang Naiding;Wang Yu;Wang Yan;Zhang Yanlu(School of Management,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xian 710129,China)

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学管理学院,陕西西安710129

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第2期242-253,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(23AZD018)。

摘　　要：在市场化和专业化的双重激励下,企业逐渐成为复杂产品研发网络进行关键技术突破的主要载体。本文基于复杂产品研发网络中的两种重要的技术创新模式:技术模仿创新和技术协同创新,考虑技术创新转化率、技术量及政策工具等因素,构建政府角色缺失下和政府补贴监管下复杂产品研发网络中研发企业间技术创新行为的演化博弈模型,研究政策工具对复杂产品研发网络中研发企业间技术创新行为演化的作用效果,并通过仿真研究复杂产品研发网络的技术创新行为的动态演化及其影响因素。研究结果表明:政府工具在复杂产品研发中具有存在的必然性;政府监管和惩罚更能促使研发企业选择技术协同创新行为;技术协同创新转化系数和协同创新技术量的组合提高,更能促进研发网络中模仿创新行为向协同创新行为的演化。Under the dual incentive of marketization and specialization,enterprises gradually become the main carrier of key technology breakthrough in complex product R&D network.Based on two important technologi‐cal innovation modes,namely technology imitative innovation and technology collaborative innovation,an evolutionary game model of technological innovation of R&D enterprises in complex product R&D network is constructed under the lack of government role and with government subsidy supervision,considering the factors of technological innovation conversion rate,technology quantity and policy tools,studying the effect of policy tools on the evolution of technology imitation innovation to technology collaborative innovation of R&D enterprises in complex product R&D network.The dynamic evolution of technology innovation behavior and its influencing factors through simulation are also researched.The results show that government tools are inevitable in the development of complex products;Government regulation and punishment can promote R&D enterprises to choose technology collaborative innovation;However,whether the core technology competitive‐ness of R&D enterprises significantly improves or not still needs further verification.

关 键 词：复杂产品研发网络 技术模仿创新 技术协同创新 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]