总经理可以自下而上监督董事长吗?——国有企业领导权结构与战略变革  

Can General Managers Monitor Chair Effectively from the Bottom up?Leadership Structure and Strategic Change in China’s SOEs

作　　者：吴德胜 徐建 WU De-sheng;XU Jian(China Academy of Corporate Governance/Business School,Nankai University,Tianjin,300071,China;Business School,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin,300222,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院/商学院,天津300071 [2]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222

出　　处：《经济管理》2023年第12期138-158,共21页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“国有企业高管团队权力结构、权力动态与战略选择和绩效”(71772093);国家自然科学基金青年项目“政府环境行为、政企关系与公司绿色治理:基于‘央地分权’的视角”(71902133)。

摘　　要：由于行政任免体制,国有企业董事长和总经理的权力显著高于其他董事和高管,二者之间的领导权结构是高管团队中最重要的权力关系。本文结合代理理论、高阶理论和权力循环理论,考察了国有企业董事长与总经理之间的领导权结构对战略变革的影响。基于国有企业的实际情况,根据董事长和总经理的所有权和薪酬、职位、职业经历和专业技能、社会和政治声望及荣誉等个人特征构建了度量二者权力的基础指标,构建了总经理与董事长之间的相对权力变量。研究发现:(1)历史绩效调节了总经理-董事长相对权力与战略变革之间的关系:当绩效较差时,总经理-董事长相对权力与战略变革规模正相关;当绩效较好时,总经理-董事长相对权力与战略变革规模负相关。(2)高管团队变更是总经理-董事长相对权力影响战略变革的一个渠道。(3)异质性分析表明,历史绩效的调节作用主要发生在环境不确定性较低和环境丰裕度较高的情境下。本文丰富了国有企业领导权结构方面的研究,对国有企业领导人选聘也具有一定的指导意义:在董事会无法对董事长进行有效监督的情形下,高管团队权力排名第二的总经理可以自下而上监督董事长;上级部门应选聘拥有足够职业经历、专业技能、声望的总经理来制衡董事长。Due to the concentrated ownership structure and the administrative governance of“the Party controls the selection and appointment of leaders”,the chairman and general manager of state-owned enterprises are appointed by shareholders and the SASAC,and are not supervised by the board of directors,resulting in the power of the two being significantly higher than that of other officers.Finkelstein pointed out that the research on executive team(TMT)must consider the power distribution of executives,and how to choose the analysis unit depends on the relative distribution among executives.The power structure or the leadership structure between chair and GM is the most important power structure in the top management team,and therefore,the power structure between the two is most worthy in the study of state-owned TMT.However,most studies on corporate governance of Chinese state-owned enterprises focus on general manager or chair,ignoring the power structure between the two.The general manager is not supervised by the board of directors,which is not beneficial to SOEs’decision-making,however,it can form a duopoly within TMT,and form a check and balance on the chair from the bottom up;the greater the power of the general manager relative to the chairman,the more effective is the monitor on chair.Combining agency theory,upper echelon theory,and power circulation theory,this paper examines the impact of the leadership structure between the chairman and general manager of state-owned enterprises on strategic change.Based on the definition of power by Finkelstein and the specific circumstances in China and SOEs,a set of personal power measures were constructed according to the biologic characteristics of the chair and general manager such as ownership and salary,position,professional experience and professional skills,social and political prestige and honor.The relative power variable between the general managers and the chairs is constructed on the basis of the set of personal power measures.This paper selects A-share st

关 键 词：总经理 董事长 权力结构 内部监督 战略变革 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]