基于鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型的跨区域河流水资源分配研究  

Water Resources Allocation in a Transregional River Based on Rubinstein Bargaining Model

作　　者：付吉斯 鲁天伟 郑勇 徐斌[4] 闫峰 何中政 熊斌 FU Ji-si;LU Tian-wei;ZHENG Yong;XU Bin;YAN Feng;HE Zhong-zheng;XIONG Bin(Key Laboratory of Poyang Lake Water Resources and Environment of Jiangxi Province,Jiangxi Academy of Water Science and Engineering,Nanchang 330029,Jiangxi Province,China;School of Infrastructure Engineering,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,Jiangxi Province,China;Key Laboratory of Poyang Lake Environment and Resources Utilization,Ministry of Education,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,Jiangxi Province,China;College of Hydrology and Water Resources,Hohai University,Nanjing 210098,Jiangsu Province,China)

机构地区：[1]江西省水利科学院江西省鄱阳湖水资源与环境重点实验室,江西南昌330029 [2]南昌大学工程建设学院,江西南昌330031 [3]南昌大学鄱阳湖环境与资源利用教育部重点实验室,江西南昌330031 [4]河海大学水文水资源学院,江苏南京210098

出　　处：《中国农村水利水电》2024年第3期16-23,33,共9页China Rural Water and Hydropower

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(52121006);江西省水利科学院开放研究基金(2021SKSH02);江西省自然科学基金(20224BAB214077);鄱阳湖环境与资源利用教育部重点实验室开放课题(2022Z03)。

摘　　要：行政区的人为分割使同一条河流流经不同的行政区域,当可分配水资源不足以满足整个区域水资源需求时,跨区域河流沿岸多利益主体因争夺稀缺的水资源就可能产生冲突。跨区域水资源分配成为解决跨区域水资源冲突问题的重要手段,鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型凭借其能反映各利益主体讨价还价能力的特点,已在解决水资源冲突问题得到成功应用。而上述鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型大多对各利益主体的贴现因子进行单一定值处理,忽略了贴现因子的动态变化影响。为此,在考虑贴现因子动态变化的基础上,提出了多主体鲁宾斯坦讨价还价水资源分配模型。首先,基于讨价还价轮次、需水量的偏离程度和调节系数确定了动态贴现因子,构建了考虑动态贴现因子的报价策略,并综合考虑时间成本和水量损失因素确定谈判成本;然后,构建了多主体鲁宾斯坦讨价还价水资源分配概念模型,讨论了3种因素对贴现因子的影响,开展了基于动态贴现因子与固定值贴现因子的鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型的对比研究;最后,以大汶河流域泰安段6个行政区为例展示了模型的效果。结果表明:提出的多主体鲁宾斯坦讨价还价水资源分配模型得到的水资源分配方案能够使结束谈判轮次提前,降低谈判成本,较好的均衡了各利益主体之间的经济社会发展水平,为得到各利益主体均能接受的合理分水方案提供了新方法,拓展了跨区域水资源分配理论。The artificial division of administrative regions makes same river flow through different administrative regions,and water flicts appear when water resources are insufficient to meet the demands claimed by stakeholders along the trans-regional rivers.Transregional water resources allocation has become an important means to solve trans-regional water conflicts.The Rubinstein bargaining model has been successfully applied in solving water conflicts due to its ability to reflect the bargaining power of various stakeholders.However,the above-mentioned Rubinstein bargaining model treats the discount factors of various stakeholders with a single fixed value,ignoring the impact of dy‐namic changes in the discount factor.This paper proposes a multi-agent Rubinstein bargaining water resources allocation model based on the consideration of the dynamic discount factor.First,the dynamic discount factor is determined based on bargaining rounds,deviation degree of water demand and adjustment coefficient,the quotation strategy considering dynamic discount factor is constructed,and the negotiation cost is determined by considering the factors of time cost and water loss.Then,a multi-agent Rubinstein bargaining water resources alloca‐tion conceptual model is established,and the influence of three factors on the dynamic discount factor is discussed,a comparative study of Rubinstein bargaining model based on dynamic and fixed value discount factor is carried out.Finally,six administrative regions in Tai’an section of Dawen River Basin are selected as examples to show the effect of the model.The results show that the water resources allocation scheme obtained by the proposed multi-agent Rubinstein bargaining water resources allocation based on dynamic discount factor can ad‐vance the negotiation round,lower the negotiation cost,and better balance the economic and social development level among various stake‐holders.The proposed model provides a new method for obtaining a reasonable water allocation scheme that is acceptabl

关 键 词：水资源冲突 多主体鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型 贴现因子 报价策略 大汶河流域 

分 类 号：TV11[水利工程—水文学及水资源]