绿色信贷、政府规制与企业绿色技术创新的演化及仿真研究  

Evolution and Simulation of Green Credit, Government Regulation andEnterprise Green Technology Innovation

作　　者：陈海汉 吕益群 CHEN Haihan;LYU Yiqun(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350116,China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350116

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第1期212-218,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：福建省科技厅软科学项目(2014R0056)。

摘　　要：通过建立由重污染企业、银行业金融机构和地方政府构成的三方演化博弈模型,分析了博弈系统的动态演化过程,并利用Matlab 2018a仿真分析进一步研究了各主体初始意愿和政府规制措施等相关因素对三方博弈演化行为的影响。研究结果表明:地方政府进行规制的初始意愿提高对重污染企业绿色技术创新和银行业金融机构开展绿色信贷有促进作用,且重污染企业策略的演化速度快于银行业金融机构,重污染企业绿色技术创新和银行业金融机构开展绿色信贷的初始意愿提高会减慢地方政府策略的演化速度;地方政府规制的奖惩力度显著促进重污染企业绿色技术创新,补贴力度对推动银行业金融机构开展绿色信贷作用较小;重污染企业创新反馈力度不改变地方政府策略稳定性,寻租成本增大有利于企业向绿色技术创新方向演化。Green finance represents a novel growth point and serves as a fresh impetus for the advancement of the green economy.It plays an important role in enhancing the ecological environment and promoting high-quality economic development.Currently,the focal point of green finance development in China centers on green credit.Both theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that green credit can effectively facilitate the transition to a green economy and achieve green growth by promoting cleaner production methods,enhancing the efficiency of green technology innovation,and optimizing energy consumption patterns.Nevertheless,as the green credit policy gains traction,challenges such as difficulties in verifying the authenticity of information pertaining to enterprise green innovation,concealment of environmental risks,and the absence of external oversight and guidance mechanisms are becoming increasingly salient.These issues significantly impact the willingness of banking and financial institutions to engage in green credit,thereby impeding the progress of the green financial system.To address these concerns,this paper formulates an evolutionary game model aimed at elucidating the dynamic interplay among enterprises,banking financial institutions,and the government within the context of green credit policy implementation.It further scrutinizes the dynamic influences of the initial participation intentions of decision-makers,government regulations,and the rent-seeking costs incurred by enterprises on the evolutionary system.This examination seeks to provide a certain degree of theoretical foundation and strategic recommendations for advancing the development of green credit.From the perspective of bounded rationality,this paper analyzes the strategy selections of local governments,heavily polluting enterprises,and banking financial institutions.It proposes relevant basic assumptions grounded in evolutionary game theory.Subsequently,using Wolfram Mathematica 13.0,the revenue payoff matrix and evolutionary stable points are

关 键 词：绿色信贷 政府规制 绿色技术创新 企业寻租 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]