高管货币薪酬与低碳投资——来自我国A股高碳排放行业上市公司的经验证据  

Executive Monetary Compensation and Low Carbon Investment--Empirical Evidence from China’s A-share Listed Firms in High Carbon Emission Industries

作　　者：傅传锐 戴青云 温皓晴 FU Chuanrui;DAI Qingyun;WEN Haoqing(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350116,China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350116

出　　处：《福建商学院学报》2023年第6期30-38,75,共10页Journal of Fujian Business University

基　　金：福建省社会科学研究基地重大项目“福建发展碳汇金融的体制机制与对策研究”(FJ2021MJDZ012);福建省社会科学研究基地重大项目“双循环新发展格局下福建金融高质量发展的新动能与新机制研究”(FJ2020MJDZ014)。

摘　　要：选取2019—2021年中国A股高碳排放行业上市公司为样本,实证检验高管货币薪酬对企业低碳投资的影响机制。研究发现:高管货币薪酬对企业低碳投资具有显著的促进作用;企业金融化水平、媒体关注度对高管货币薪酬与低碳投资水平间的关系存在显著的调节效应;高管货币薪酬通过降低代理风险、提高盈利能力进而促进企业低碳投资。应进一步建立以低碳排放为导向的高管货币薪酬机制,优化企业资源配置,重视媒体对高碳排放企业的监督作用,以助力我国“双碳”目标的实现,推动经济高质量发展。This paper empirically examines the influence mechanism of executive monetary compensation incentives on corporate low-carbon investment in high-carbon emission enterprises,using A-share listed companies in high-carbon emission industry as a sample from 2019 to 2021.It is found that executive monetary compensation incentive has a significant promoting effect on corporate low-carbon investment.There are significant moderating effects of financialization level and media attention on the relationship between executive monetary compensation incentives and low-carbon investment level.Executive monetary compensation incentives promote corporate low-carbon investment by reducing agency risk and improving profitability.Accordingly,it is suggested that a low-carbon emission-oriented executive monetary compensation incentive mechanism should be further established,and the allocation of corporate resources should be optimized.Meanwhile,the monitoring role of the media on high-carbon emission enterprises should be emphasized,so as to help China achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals and promote high-quality economic development.

关 键 词：高管货币薪酬 低碳投资 企业金融化 媒体关注度 代理风险 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]