高管过度自信会影响股价崩盘风险吗?——基于并购溢价的实证研究  

Can Executive Overconfidence Affect the Risk of Stock Price Collapse?--Empirical Research Based on M&A Premiums

作　　者：任宗强 陈婷[1] 李如秒 REN Zongqiang;CHEN Ting;Li Rumiao(School of Business,Wenzhou University,Wenzhou 325035,China;School of Financial Management,Zhejiang Financial College,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]温州大学商学院,浙江温州325035 [2]浙江金融职业学院金融管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《经济论坛》2024年第3期69-81,共13页Economic Forum

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“面向智能制造的传统企业创新能力提升机制与路径研究”(17BGL044)。

摘　　要：基于2010—2020年沪深A股上市公司进行实证研究,引入“并购溢价”这一中介变量,分析高管过度自信影响股价崩盘风险的作用机制。研究结果显示:高管过度自信程度越高,企业面临的股价崩盘风险越高;高管过度自信会显著提高企业并购溢价水平,从而加大股价崩盘风险发生的可能性。进一步分析发现,高管过度自信影响股价崩盘风险的作用机制在不同产权性质企业里的表现有所差异,相较于国有企业,这一作用机制对非国有企业的影响更为显著。基于此,提出减少高管过度自信、完善信息披露制度、抑制并购溢价、建立风险监测和预警机制等防范措施,以促进资本市场平稳健康发展。Based on empirical research on A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2020,this paper introduces the intermediary variable of M&A premium and analyzes the acting mechanism of how executive overconfidence affects the risk of stock price collapse.The research results show that:The higher the de-gree of executive overconfidence,the higher the risk of stock price collapse faced by the company;executive over-confidence will significantly increase the level of M&A premium of the company,thereby exacerbating the risk of stock price collapse.A further analysis finds that this mechanism has different effects in enterprises with different property rights natures,and compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises suffer more signif-icant effects.Based on the above,this paper puts forward such precautionary measures as reducing executive over-confidence,improving the disclosure system of information,inhibiting M&A premium and establishing mechanisms of risk monitoring and early warning with a view to promoting the stable and healthy development of capital markets.

关 键 词：高管过度自信 股价崩盘风险 并购溢价 产权性质 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]