企业寻租、高压反腐与企业创新  

Enterprise Rent Seeking,High-pressure Anti-corruption,and Enterprise Innovation

作　　者：陈字理 马文聪[2] 张光宇[2] 陈修德[2] CHEN Zi-li;MA Wen-cong;ZHANG Guang-yuCHEN Xiu-de(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510630;School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510630 [2]广东工业大学管理学院,广州510520

出　　处：《软科学》2024年第3期93-98,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71874036、72074056)。

摘　　要：利用2008—2020年中国A股上市企业数据,探讨企业寻租、高压反腐与企业创新三者之间的关系以及关系机制。研究发现:(1)企业层面的寻租能够促进创新活动的开展,但行业层面的寻租会抑制该行业的创新;(2)寻租能够通过保护创新成果免受掠夺的“保护费”功能与获得资源的“润滑剂”功能促进创新;(3)高压反腐能够有效抑制寻租“润滑剂”与“保护费”功能的发挥,从而一定程度上消除寻租对创新的扭曲效应;(4)相对利用式创新,寻租对创新的扭曲效应以及高压反腐的修正作用在探索式创新活动当中更加明显。Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020,this paper explores the relationship and mechanism among rent-seeking, high-pressure anti-corruption, and corporate innovation. Research has found that(1) rent-seeking at the enterprise level can promote innovation activities, but industry-level rent-seeking can inhibit innovation in the industry.(2) Renting can promote innovation through the “protection fee” function of protecting innovative achievements from plunder and the “lubricant” function of obtaining resources.(3) High-pressure anti-corruption can effectively suppress the functions of rent-seeking as a “lubricant” and “protection fee”,thereby eliminating the distorting effect of rent-seeking on innovation to a certain extent.(4) Compared to exploitative innovation, the distorting effect of rent-seeking on innovation and the corrective effect of high-pressure anti-corruption are more evident in exploratory innovation activities.

关 键 词：企业寻租 企业创新 高压反腐 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学] F273.1[政治法律—中共党史] F832.51[经济管理—企业管理]