CEO开放性与创新知识资产:管理机制的差异性作用  

CEO Openness and Innovative Knowledge Assets:Differential Roles of Managerial Mechanism

作　　者：刘业鑫 吴伟伟[2] 张金泽 于渤[2] LIU Yexin;WU Weiwei;ZHANG Jinze;YU Bo(School of Economics and Management,Harbin Institute of Technology at Weihai,Weihai 264209,China;School of Management,Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001,China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学(威海)经济管理学院,山东威海264209 [2]哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院,哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《管理科学》2023年第5期85-98,共14页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72072047);山东省自然科学基金(ZR2023QG010);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(HIT.HSS.ESD202310);哈尔滨工业大学研究生教育教学改革研究项目(23MS011)。

摘　　要：知识经济时代,创新知识资产是企业获取持续竞争优势的重要途径。作为企业的主要决策者,CEO对创新知识资产具有重要影响。CEO开放性为积累创新知识资产提供了重要动力,但其效用的发挥取决于企业的管理机制。虽然已有研究已经认识到CEO开放性对企业创新的重要作用,但较少关注CEO开放性与创新知识资产之间的关系以及管理机制对二者关系的影响。因此,CEO开放性在管理机制的作用下如何影响创新知识资产这一问题值得进一步深入研究。基于高阶梯队理论,分析CEO开放性对创新知识资产的影响,将管理机制分为激励机制和监督机制,探讨两种机制对CEO开放性与创新知识资产之间关系的差异性作用。以2015年至2017年在上海和深圳证券交易所发行的全部A股制造业上市企业为研究对象,采用多元回归分析,实证检验CEO开放性对创新知识资产的影响以及管理机制对二者关系的影响。研究结果表明,CEO开放性对创新知识资产具有显著的促进作用。管理机制中的激励机制和监督机制对CEO开放性与创新知识资产之间关系的影响具有非对称性特征。激励机制中,只有薪酬水平对CEO开放性与创新知识资产之间的关系起正向调节作用,持股比例对二者之间关系的调节作用不显著;监督机制中,独立董事比例和两职合一均能对CEO开放性与创新知识资产之间的关系起正向调节作用。研究结果证实CEO开放性对创新知识资产具有重要作用,拓展了对CEO开放性效用的理论认识;识别了CEO开放性影响创新知识资产过程中的情景因素,从权变视角丰富了CEO开放性和创新知识资产的理论研究;揭示了管理机制对CEO开放性与创新知识资产之间关系的非对称性调节作用,丰富了对管理机制作用规律的认识,也为企业有效利用CEO开放性促进创新知识资产提供了理论指导。In the era of knowledge economy,innovative knowledge assets are an important way for firms to obtain sustainable competitive advantage.As the principal decision maker of a firm,the CEO has an important impact on innovative knowledge assets.CEO openness provides an important driving force for the accumulation of innovative knowledge assets,yet its effectiveness depends on the firm's managerial mechanism.Although the existing studies have recognized the important role of CEO openness in firm innovation,less attention has been paid to the relationship between CEO openness and innovative knowledge assets and the impact of managerial mechanism on the relationship.Therefore,how CEO openness affects innovative knowledge assets under the impact of managerial mechanism is worthy of further research.Based on the upper echelons theory,this study investigates the impact of CEO openness on innovative knowledge assets.By dividing the managerial mechanism into incentive mechanism and monitoring mechanism,this study further explores the asymmetric effects of these two managerial mechanisms on the relationship between CEO openness and innovative knowledge assets.This study takes all the A-share manufacturing listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2015 to 2017 as samples.This study tests the impact of CEO openness on innovative knowledge assets and the moderating roles of managerial mechanism by using the multiple regression analysis.The results show that CEO openness has a significant impact on promoting innovative knowledge assets.The impacts of the incentive mechanism and the monitoring mechanism in the managerial mechanism on the relationship between CEO openness and innovative knowledge assets have asymmetric characteristics.In the incentive mechanism,only CEO compensation could positively moderate the relationship between CEO openness and innovative knowledge assets,and the CEO shareholding ration has no significant moderating impact on the relationship between CEO openness and innovative knowledge as

关 键 词：CEO开放性 创新知识资产 管理机制 调节作用 非对称性特征 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]