我、你和我们:超越个体主义和集体主义  

I, You, and We: Beyond Individualism and Collectivism

作　　者：丹·扎哈维 李毅(译) Dan Zahavi

机构地区：[1]丹麦哥本哈根大学 [2]上海交通大学人文学院

出　　处：《哲学分析》2024年第2期3-20,196,共19页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：欧洲研究理事会(ERC)欧盟“地平线2020”研究和创新计划资助(协议号:832940);嘉士伯基金会资助(编号:CF18-1107)。

摘　　要：当代分析哲学中关于集体意向性的争论持续了几十年,但关于我们的本质以及个体与群体之间关系的问题显然由来已久,可以在早期现象学中找到尤其丰富的讨论。虽然现象学家们从对个体心灵的兴趣出发,但他们已在第一次世界大战爆发前不久开始了对二元的人际关系样式的探索,并于几年后深入展开了对意向性的集体样式的广泛分析。现象学对此话题的独特贡献在于其对第一、第二人称单数和第一人称复数视角之间关系的探索。我、你、我们是怎样交织关联在一起的?对这一问题的回答,呈现出现象学早期论争中的一些核心见解。The contemporary debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy has lasted several decades,but questions concerning the nature of we and the relation between the individual and the community are obviously far older.We can find a particularly rich discussion in early phenomenology.Indeed,while starting out with an interest in the individual mind,phenomenologists began their exploration of dyadic forms of interpersonal relations shortly before the start of World War I and were already deeply engaged in extensive analyses of collective forms of intentionality a few years later.A distinctive feature of the phenomenological contribution was its exploration of the relation between the first-and second-person singular and the first-person plural perspectives.How are I,you and we intertwined?The aim of the present paper is to present some core insights from this early debate.

关 键 词：现象学 心灵哲学 集体意向性 社会认知 最小自我 

分 类 号：B516[哲学宗教—外国哲学]