“我们”与集体意向性——基于共同行动和情绪共享的考察  

“We”and Collective Intentionality

作　　者：罗志达 LUO Zhida

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系(珠海)

出　　处：《哲学分析》2024年第2期33-46,196,共15页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：国家重大人才支持计划(项目编号:2022WRQB02);中山大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目“现象学与儒学视域下的生存论情感研究”(项目编号:22wkqb10)。

摘　　要：分析哲学关于集体意向性有三种主流进路:布拉特曼的“对象进路”、吉尔伯特的“主体进路”,以及塞尔的“我们模式”进路。这些进路各自隐含着困难,也遭到系统的挑战。现象学关于集体意向性的最新方案,特别是扎哈维的“第二人称参与”和施密德的“复数自身觉知”理论,从传统对共同行动的关注,转向对情绪共享等社会现象的研究,拓展了社会本体论的研究范围及其涉及的更为基础的“相互隶属感”。In this paper,I mainly discuss three current approaches to collective intentionality in analyticphilosophy,including Michael Bratman’s object interpretation,Margaret Gilbert’s subject interpretation,and John Searle’s we-mode interpretation.After briefly analyzing the implicit difficulties in these approaches,Idiscuss two recent alternatives that mainly draw upon the phenomenological tradition,including Dan Zahavi’s account of second-person engagement and Hans Schmid’s of plural self-awareness.I point that with a shift offocus from joint action to emotional sharing,we can enlarge the scope of analysis in the social ontology debate and probe into the basic“sense of mutual belonging”that serves as foundation for all social phenomena.

关 键 词：共同行动 情绪共享 我们 集体意向性 

分 类 号：B516[哲学宗教—外国哲学]