Quality disclosure strategies for small business enterprises under consumer loss aversion  

作　　者：Danli Yao Simai He Meng Zheng 

机构地区：[1]Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai,200093,China [2]School of Information Management and Engineering,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai,200433,China

出　　处：《Journal of Management Science and Engineering》2024年第1期62-87,共26页管理科学学报（英文版）

基　　金：Danli Yao was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant number 72301174;the Ministry of Education,Humanities and Social Science Projects under grant number 23YJC630010;Simai He received support from the Major Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)Grant(72192830,72192832);Grant 71825003.Meng Zheng was supported by the China Scholarship Council under grant number 202206480040;the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant number 72192832.

摘　　要：In this paper,we focus on small business enterprises(SBEs)that usually have low market power but can rely on retailers to transact sales and gain the ability to disclose quality information.Moreover,consumer loss aversion(CLA)is pronounced when buying from SBEs that have yet to develop a strong reputation and uncertain quality.We focus on two competing SBEs with heterogeneous quality levels and discuss their quality disclosure strategiesd whether selling through a retailerd in the context of CLA.We study the interaction between consumers'prior belief in product quality and CLA and how these factors affect equilibrium outcomes.We show that a situation in which low-quality and high-quality SBEs both choose to disclose will not occur under a neutral consumer attitude,i.e.,it happens only when the aversion level is significant.When the aversion level is low,either the low-quality SBE or the high-quality SBE will decide to disclose,and the disclosing party depends on the prior belief.In addition,CLA significantly impacts the monotonicity of both SBEs'and retailers'prices and profits relating to the consumers'prior beliefs.

关 键 词：Quality disclosure Consumer loss aversion COMPETITION Game theory 

分 类 号：G229.2[文化科学] F713.55[经济管理—市场营销]