谢林与康德论有机体的偶然性  

Schelling and Kant on Contingency of Organism

作　　者：常文琦 先刚[1] CHANG Wenqi;XIAN Gang(Department of Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系,北京100871

出　　处：《山西大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第2期19-26,共8页Journal of Shanxi University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“德国唯心论在费希特、谢林和黑格尔哲学体系中的不同终结方案研究”(20BZX088)。

摘　　要：康德和谢林对有机体有着类似的刻画,有机体的偶然性特征使他们面临类似的二律背反。康德和谢林对有机体的偶然性给出了不同的处理方案,这使得他们的有机体理论最终呈现出不同的面貌:康德为消除偶然性为有机体找到的目的论原则必然会与机械论原则陷入冲突,而其采取的“目的-手段”式的统一方案无法实现二者的真正统一;谢林为保证偶然性而赋予有机体的独特的肯定性本原与代表必然性的否定性本原同样会构成冲突,但谢林通过维持这个冲突的方式来化解冲突,不仅捍卫了有机体的偶然性特征,而且保证了整个有机世界内部的发展进程,实现了相互冲突的本原之间真正意义上的统一。Kant and Schelling have a similar portrayal of the organism, and they are confronted with a similar antinomy due to the contingent character of the organism. Kant and Schelling give different solutions to the contingency of the organism, which makes their theories of the organism ultimately different: the teleological principle that Kant finds for the organism to eliminate contingency will inevitably be in conflict with the mechanistic principle, and the “ends-means” unification scheme adopted by Kant cannot achieve the true unity of the two. The positive principle that Schelling gives to the organism to ensure contingency and the negative principle that represents necessity are also in conflict, but Schelling solves the conflict by maintaining this conflict in a way that not only defends the contingent character of the organism, but also ensures the process of development within the organic world, and achieves the real unity between the conflicting principles.

关 键 词：谢林 康德 有机体 偶然性 

分 类 号：B516.3[哲学宗教—外国哲学]