债务融资对终极股东行为影响的实证分析——基于内部控制质量的门限效应和调节效应  

An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Debt Financing on Ultimate Shareholder Behavior——Threshold Effect and Regulation Effect Based on Internal Control Quality

作　　者：何芳丽[1] 李思锐 HE Fangi;LI Sirui(School of Mathematics and Computational Sciences,Guilin University Of Electronic Technology,Guilin,Guangxi 541004)

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学数学与计算科学学院,广西桂林541004

出　　处：《管理现代化》2024年第2期61-68,共8页Modernization of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“基于机器学习方法的企业债券违约的智能预警研究”(71961004);国家自然科学基金项目“面向区间数序列的非线性预测模型的构建与优化研究”(72361009);广西高校中青年教师科研基础能力提升项目《政策不确定性对股票、债券和基金相关性影响研究》(2020KY05003)。

摘　　要：集中股权结构的上市公司中,终极股东对其他中小股东有一定的利益侵害动机,债务融资作为公司治理的一个重要环节,研究其对终极股东行为的影响是一个值得探究的问题。以我国523家非金融类上市公司2007-2022年的面板数据为样本,考虑内部控制质量的门限效应与调节效应,实证检验了债务融资对终极股东掏空行为的促进或抑制效应。研究发现:(1)银行债务、商业信用和长期债务对终极股东掏空行为具有显著的促进效应;当内部控制质量分别大于门限值860.160、873.700、873.700时,此类效应减弱;(2)短期债务对终极股东掏空行为具有显著的抑制效应;当内部控制质量大于门限值873.700时,此效应得到加强;(3)商业信用、长期债务、银行债务对于国有企业中终极股东掏空行为的促进效应,受到内部控制质量的反向调节。研究结论为上市公司制定健全的内部治理环境策略以及为债权人制定合理的借贷策略从而促进上市公司高质量发展提供了参考依据。In listed companies with centralized equity structures,ultimate shareholders have strong motivations to infringe on the interests of other small and medium shareholders.Debt financ-ing is an important part of corporate governance,and it is an issue worth exploring to study its im-pact on ultimate shareholder behavior.Taking panel data of 523 non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2022 in China as a sample,we have empirically tested the promotion or suppression effects of debt financing on ultimate shareholder tunneling behavior when considering the threshold effects and regulatory effects of internal control quality.It’s found in the study that:(1)bank debt,commer-cial credit,and long-term debt have a significant promoting effect on ultimate shareholder tunneling behavior;when the quality of internal control exceeds the threshold values of 860.160,873.700,and 873.700,respectively,the effect is reduced;(2)short-term debt has a significant inhibitory effect on ultimate shareholder hollowing behavior;when the quality of internal control is greater than the threshold value of 873.700,the effect is enhanced;(3)commercial credit,long-term debt,and bank debt promote the ultimate shareholder tunneling behavior in state-owned enterprises,which is re-versely adjusted by the quality of internal control.The research findings provide a reference basis for listed companies to formulate sound internal governance environment strategies and develop reason-able lending strategies for creditors to promote high-quality development of listed companies.

关 键 词：债务融资 内部控制质量 终极控制股东 面板门限模型 静态面板回归模型 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济]