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作 者:杨晴 闵杰 欧剑 YANG Qing;MIN Jie;OU Jian(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Jianzhu University,Hefei 230601,China;School of Mathematics&Physics,Anhui Jianzhu University,Hefei 230601,China)
机构地区:[1]安徽建筑大学经济与管理学院,合肥230601 [2]安徽建筑大学数理学院,合肥230601
出 处:《青岛大学学报(自然科学版)》2024年第1期85-92,共8页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)
基 金:国家自然科学基金(批准号:72271004)资助。
摘 要:为了探究在线评论背景下品牌商直销渠道引入决策及其影响,利用博弈理论,构建了由品牌商和电商平台组成的Stackelberg博弈模型。研究结果表明,仅当产品的在线评论有较高的正面效应时,品牌商才可能引入直销渠道,且消费者对直销渠道的认可度越高,品牌商引入直销渠道的动机越强,此时品牌商直销渠道入侵会产生双赢的结果;无论直销渠道是否入侵,在线评论都可能降低自营渠道的双重边际化效应问题。A Stackelberg game model with brand merchants and e-commerce platforms was created using game theory to investigate the decision and influence of brand merchants to launch direct sales channels under the background of online reviews.The research results show that brand merchants are only motivated to introduce direct sales channels when the online reviews of products have highly positive effects,and increasing consumer recognition of direct sales channels can promote the introduction of direct sales channels.At this point,the invasion of brand merchants direct sales channels will result in a win-win situation.Online reviews may lessen the problem of double marginalization of self-operated channels,whether or not direct sales channels are invading.
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