政府补贴下新能源汽车产业三级供应链减排策略研究  

Research on Emission Reduction Strategies in the Three-Tier Supply Chain of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies

作　　者：符瑛 龚哲宇 吴为 李伟 张文轩 FU Ying;GONG Zhe-yu;WU Wei;LI Wei;ZHANG Wen-xuan(College of Logistics and Transportation,Central South University of Forestry and Technology,Changsha,410004,China)

机构地区：[1]中南林业科技大学物流与交通学院,湖南长沙410004

出　　处：《物流研究》2024年第2期29-39,共11页Logistics Research

基　　金：湖南省教育厅重点项目“汽车产业集群供应链企业技术创新合作博弈策略研究”(22A0184)。

摘　　要：考虑政府减排成本补贴,研究供应商、制造商与零售商组成的新能源汽车三级供应链合作减排策略,以产品减排量与低碳商誉作为状态变量,通过构建非合作、一般合作和契约合作三种情形下微分博弈模型,分析供应链成员努力程度与定价对利润、减排量与低碳商誉的影响。研究表明:在两种合作情形下供应链成员利润均随着政府补贴成本力度增加而提高,但补贴力度需根据不同合作情形差异化设定;改进的收益共享与成本共担契约情形下产品减排量与低碳商誉能达到最优,并可以实现帕累托Pareto改进,其改进效果与价格加成系数相关。Considering government subsidies for emission reduction costs,this paper studies the cooperative emission reduction strategy of a three-level supply chain of new energy vehicles composed of suppliers,manufacturers,and retailers.The relationship between product emission reduction and low-carbon goodwill is considered as state variables.A differential game model is constructed under three scenarios:non cooperative,general cooperative,and contractual cooperative,to analyze the impact of supply chain members’efforts and pricing on profits,emission reduction,and lowcarbon goodwill.Research shows that in all three cooperation scenarios,the profits of supply chain members increase with the increase of government subsidy costs,but the subsidy intensity needs to be differentiated according to different cooperation scenarios;In the case of improved revenue sharing and cost sharing contracts,product emission reduction and low-carbon goodwill can achieve optimal results,and Pareto improvement can be achieved.The improvement effect is related to the price markup coefficient.

关 键 词：政府补贴 三级供应链 减排策略 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]