地方政策执行过程中的“政策拉练”:模型构建与案例分析  

“Policy Performance Competition”in Local Government Policy Implementation Process——Model Construction and Case Analysis

作　　者：丁煌[1,2] 卫劭华 Ding Huang;Wei Shaohua(School of Political Science and Public Administration and Director at National Governance and Public Policy Research Center,Wuhan University;School of Political Science and Public Administration,Wuhan University.Wuhan 430072)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学国家治理与公共政策研究中心 [2]武汉大学政治与公共管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2024年第3期6-16,共11页Chinese Public Administration

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“地方政府公共政策执行行为选择机制的演化博弈分析”(编号:72174155);国家社会科学基金重点项目“提高政策效能与地方政府公共政策执行力研究”(编号:11AZZ004)。

摘　　要：现实中的“政策拉练”是我国地方政策执行过程中常见却鲜有分析的一种现象。基于T区三次乡村振兴“政策拉练”过程的田野观察,运用政策执行研究的博弈分析法,构建与呈现了中国政策执行情境下“政策拉练”的理论模型及其运作图景。研究表明:“政策拉练”是指上级政府对多个下级政府政策执行情况予以检评并依据检评结果决定奖惩分布的一种竞争性激励机制;机制运行过程中政府上下级博弈关系的不完全性导致“政策拉练”的激励效应处在变动之中。本文试图论证“政策拉练”作为一种分析政策执行激励的理论概念所具有的学术内涵与经验意义,以期为政策执行和执行激励机制改革提供理论启示与实践参考。“Policy performance competition”is a phenomenon that is common but seldom analyzed in the process of local government policy implementation in China.Based on the field observation of the process of three rural revitalization“policy performance competitions”in T-zone,using the game analysis method of policy implementation research,this paper constructs and presents the theoretical model and operation picture of“policy performance competition”in the context of China’s policy implementation.The findings indicate that:“policy performance competition”refers to a competitive incentive mechanism in which the high-level government inspects and evaluates the policy implementation of several low-level governments and decides the distribution of rewards and punishments according to the evaluation results;the incompleteness of the game relationship between the upper and lower levels of the government in the operation of this mechanism leads to the changing incentive effect of“policy performance competition”.This paper attempts to demonstrate the academic connotation and empirical significance of“policy performance competition”as a theoretical concept to analyze the incentive of policy implementation,in order to provide theoretical insights and practical reference for the design of the incentive structure reform of government organizations.

关 键 词：地方政策执行 “政策拉练” 激励机制 组织经济学 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]