有限合伙协议架构企业的盈余管理之谜:长期导向还是机会主义?  

The Mystery of Earnings Management in the Limited Partnership Agreement Structure Enterprises:Long-term Orientation or Opportunism?

作　　者：史亚雅 梁上坤[2] 叶文平 魏娟 Shi Yaya;Liang Shangkun;Ye Wenping;Wei Juan(School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economics;School of Accounting,Central University of Finance and Economics;School of Management,Jinan University;School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院 [2]中央财经大学会计学院 [3]暨南大学管理学院 [4]广东工业大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2024年第4期215-231,共17页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“双重认知能力与制度环境互动的创新性创业生成机制研究”(基金号:72272063);国家自然科学基金面上项目“区域竞争、区域协同与企业产能效率提升:理论机制与实证分析”(基金号:72272164);国家自然科学基金青年项目“不对称信息与权力结构下的供应链融资模式与协调机制研究”(基金号:71801111);国家自然科学基金重点国际(地区)合作研究项目“家族企业国际化与创新:基于制度—文化的比较研究”(基金号:71810107002);山东省自然科学基金青年项目“企业数字化转型对创新战略的影响机理与后果研究”(基金号:ZR2022QG055);广东省哲学社会科学共建项目“构建广东制造业高质量发展的新引擎——‘链式’关系助推企业数字化转型的路径与对策研究”(基金号:GD23XYJ20)的资助。

摘　　要：有限合伙协议架构(LP架构)作为企业实现财务资本与人力资本专业化分工的重要控制权创新模式,受到实践者与政策制定者的广泛关注,但学者们对于LP架构经济后果的研究莫衷一是。基于此,本文以信息质量为切入点,利用2011~2021年中国沪深两市A股IPO的非国有上市公司样本,考察LP架构对企业盈余管理的影响。研究结果表明,相比于非LP架构企业,采用LP架构的企业显著增加了向下的应计盈余管理,而真实盈余管理没有明显差异。机制分析发现,LP架构企业通过向下盈余管理减少股利分配,以增加自由现金流和未来的研发投入,而不是出于控股股东资金占用或关联方担保等机会主义动机。进一步分析显示,LP架构对盈余管理的影响在现金流波动较大、风险承担水平偏高、财务业绩较好、有限合伙人来源于内部,以及在股票禁售期内的企业更加显著。最后,本文发现压力抵制型机构投资者持股、分析师跟踪和交易所问询等外部治理机制显著抑制了LP架构企业的盈余管理行为。本文不仅从信息质量角度深化和扩展了LP架构的公司治理效率研究,同时为监管者完善信息披露制度,以及投资者识别LP架构企业价值提供了重要的经验参考。Limited partnership agreement structure(LP structure),as an important control innovation model for enterprises to realize the specialization of financial capital and human capital,has been widely concerned by practitioners and policy makers,but scholars have different opinions on the economic consequences of LP structure.Focusing on information quality,this paper examines the impact of LP structure on earnings management using non-state-owned A-share initial public offering companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2011 to 2021.The results show that,compared with enterprises that do not adopt LP structure,enterprises with LP structure significantly increase downward accrual earnings management,while there is no significant difference in real earnings management.The mechanism analysis shows that enterprises with LP structure reduce dividend distribution through downward accruals in order to increase free cash flow and future R&D investment,rather than the controlling shareholder's funds occupation,related party guarantees or other opportunistic motives.Further,it shows that the impact of LP structure on earnings management is more significant in the companies with higher volatility in cash flows,higher risk taking,better financial performance,limited partners from within,and the companies in the stock lock-up period.Finally.this paper finds that external governance mechanisms such as pressure-resistant institutional investor holding,analyst tracking and stock exchange inquiry significantly inhibit earnings management of enterprises with LP structure.This paper not only deepens and expands the study on corporate governance efficiency of LP structure from the perspective of information quality,but also provides important reference for regulators to improve the information disclosure policies and investors to identify the value of enterprises with LP structure.

关 键 词：有限合伙协议架构 盈余管理 长期导向 外部治理机制 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51