基于动态主从博弈模型的综合能源系统碳交易方法  

A carbon trading method for integrated energy systems based on a dynamic master-slave game model

作　　者：陈勇 芮俊 肖雷鸣 邓超 CHEN Yong;RUI Jun;XIAO Leiming;DENG Chao(Hangzhou Electric Power Design Institute Co.,Ltd.Yuhang Branch,Hangzhou 311121,China;School of Automation,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州市电力设计院有限公司余杭分公司,杭州311121 [2]杭州电子科技大学自动化学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《浙江电力》2024年第4期51-62,共12页Zhejiang Electric Power

基　　金：浙江大有集团有限公司科技项目(DY2022-22);浙江省科技计划项目(2024C01018)。

摘　　要：为完善发展碳交易机制中多主体之间的利益互动关系,提出一种以碳交易JMO(联合市场运营商)为领导者、多主体IES(综合能源系统)为跟随者的主从博弈方法,实现不同IES的低碳经济运行。首先,在碳排放阶梯惩罚机制下对各利益主体IES运行效益进行建模分析,提出IES低碳排和低成本双重模式可选的运行策略。其次,基于动态非合作Stackelberg博弈优化框架,根据各利益主体的运行模式,建立多主体参与的碳交易模型。最后,分别采用自适应差分进化算法和Gurobi求解器对主从博弈决策模型进行求解。算例分析结果表明,该碳交易机制可有效实现IES运行的低碳性和经济性。To enhance the interaction among multiple agents in carbon trading mechanisms,a leader-follower game method is proposed,with carbon trading JMO(joint market operator)as the leader and multiple IES(integrated en⁃ergy systems)as followers.This method aims to achieve low-carbon economic operation for different IES.Firstly,un⁃der the tiered penalty mechanism for carbon emission,the operational benefits of various agents’IES are modeled and analyzed.A dual-mode operation strategy for IES,which includes options for low carbon emission and low cost,is proposed.Secondly,based on the dynamic non-cooperative Stackelberg game optimization framework,a carbon trading model involving multiple agents is established according to the operational modes of each agent.Finally,the decision-making model of the leader-follower game is solved using both adaptive differential evolution(DE)algo⁃rithm and the Gurobi optimizer.Case analysis results demonstrate that this carbon trading mechanism can effectively achieve both low-carbon and economic operation for IES.

关 键 词：低碳 综合能源系统 碳排放 碳交易 动态非合作Stackelberg博弈 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F426.2