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作 者:张兴亮 周艺 Zhang Xingliang;Zhou Yi(School of Accounting,Nanjiang Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)
出 处:《工业技术经济》2024年第5期100-112,共13页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目“基于高管递延薪酬设计视角的国有企业杠杆率治理研究”(项目编号:19BGL063)。
摘 要:公司治理是企业决策与行动的基础,研究碳排放权交易试点政策是否有公司治理效应,有助于厘清试点政策对环境治理的作用机制。本文认为,试点政策打破了股东与高管之间的博弈均衡,需要对高管薪酬契约进行调整以达到新的均衡。基于上市公司数据,研究发现,试点政策使企业调低了高管薪酬业绩敏感性,且在高碳行业中更显著;机制检验结果表明,由于试点政策降低了企业业绩,为了提高企业绿色转型的内部动力,企业做出降低高管薪酬业绩敏感性的决策。研究还发现,试点企业采用股权激励的可能性更高,并且那些降低高管薪酬业绩敏感性的试点企业会有更多的绿色创新和更好的ESG表现。本文是对研究试点政策效果文献的补充,也能为如何激发企业环境治理的内部动力提供启示。Corporate governance is the basis for corporate decision-making and action.Studying whether the Carbon Emissions Trading Pilot Policy(CETPP)has corporate governance effects will help clarify the mechanism of CETPP on environmental governance.This paper argues that CETPP has broken the game equilibrium between shareholders and executives,and it is necessary to adjust the executive compensation contract to achieve a new equilibrium.Based on data from listed companies,the paper finds that CETTP has reduced the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance,which is more significant in high carbon industries.The mechanism test results indicate that due to CETTP reducing corporate performance,in order to enhance the internal motivation for green transformation of enterprises,enterprises have made decisions to reduce the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.The paper also finds that pilot enterprises are more likely to adopt equity incentives,and those that reduce the sensitivity of executive compensation performance will have more green innovation and better ESG performance.The paper is a supplement to the literature on the effectiveness of CETTP and can also provide insights on how to stimulate the internal motivation of corporate environmental governance.
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