共同机构所有权能抑制控股股东的私利行为吗  被引量:7

Does Joint Institutional Ownership Mitigate the Self-Serving Practices of Controlling Shareholders?

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:王文南翔 胡日东[1] Wang Wennanxiang;Hu Ridong

机构地区:[1]华侨大学数量经济研究中心

出  处:《金融经济学研究》2024年第2期107-124,共18页Financial Economics Research

基  金:国家社会科学基金项目(21AJY001);福建省社会科学基金重大项目(FJ2022Z011)。

摘  要:基于A股上市公司2007—2021年数据,考察共同机构所有权在企业第二类代理问题中发挥的作用。研究发现,共同机构所有权显著抑制控股股东私利行为,该结论经Heckman两阶段、PSM等内生性与稳健性检验后依旧成立,说明共同机构投资者扮演监督者,而非合谋者角色。机制分析显示,共同机构投资者对控股股东具有更低的监督成本,可以通过退出威胁与委派董事的方式抑制控股股东私利行为。进一步研究发现,对非国有性质的企业来说,上述抑制效应程度更大。共同机构所有权能提升企业价值,且共同机构所有权与第一大股东持股比例的交乘项越大,企业价值越高,意味着共同机构投资者通过监督控股股东提升企业价值,呼应主旨结论。因此,建议监管部门积极引导和规范共同机构所有权,以缓解中国控股股东与中小股东的利益冲突,同时企业也应当充分利用共同机构所有权的信息优势,大力促进企业间协作,不断提升企业价值。This study harnesses data from A-share listed firms spanning 2007 to 2021 to delve into the function of joint institutional ownership in the context of corporate secondary agency dilemmas.It unveils that joint institutional ownership notably curbs the self-serving practices of controlling shareholders.This deduction holds steady even post-application of Heckman two-stage,propensity score matching endogeneity,and robustness tests,which underlines that joint in-stitutional investors play the role of watchmen rather than conspirators.Mechanistic analysis sug-gests that joint institutional investors can restrain the self-serving practices of controlling share-holders via economies of scale,exit threats,and board member appointments.Further research discovers that,for non-state-owned firms,the aforesaid restraining effect is more conspicuous;joint institutional ownership can augment corporate value,and this impact intensifies as the share-holding ratio of the principal shareholder rises.Based on these findings,it is recommended that regulatory bodies proactively guide and oversee joint institutional ownership to assuage conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and small shareholders.Concurrently,firms should fully exploit the informational advantage of joint institutional ownership,earnestly propel inter-firm collaboration,and ceaselessly magnify corporate value.

关 键 词:共同机构所有权 控股股东私利行为 委派董事 企业价值 

分 类 号:F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象