伊本·西那的飞人论证和原初自我意识的通透性  

Ibn Sina's Flying Man Argument and the Transparency of Primitive Self-Awareness

作　　者：张天一 Zhang Tianyi

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院哲学研究所

出　　处：《世界哲学》2024年第2期127-137,F0003,共12页World Philosophy

摘　　要：伊本·西那的飞人实验是阿拉伯哲学史上最著名的思想实验之一。飞人实验的最完整版本以飞人论证的形态出现在伊本·西那的中期哲学大全《治疗书·论灵魂》中,旨在证明人的灵魂(或自我)的存在及其非物质性。国际学界关于如何解读飞人论证一直存在着诸多争议,很多学者提出降低门槛式的解读,认为它不是一个严格的、成功的论证,因为它似乎涉及蒙面人谬论。然而,伊本·西那在晚期哲学书信集《探讨》中,却明确指出飞人论证是一个“确凿的论证”。事实上,重构飞人论证而不犯下蒙面人谬论的关键,在于揭示其隐藏前提——原初自我意识的通透性;而这一前提已经蕴含在了伊本·西那在晚期哲学著作《探讨》和《注释》中所详尽阐发的原初自我意识理论中。Ibn Sind's(Avicenna)Flying Man is one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of Arabic philosophy.The fullest version of the Flying Man appears in the form of the Flying Man Argument(FMA)in al-Shifa':al-Nafs,establishing the existence of the human soul(or self)and its incorporeality.Modern scholars hold very different views about how to interpret the FMA;many adopt a bar-lowering approach,arguing that it is not a rigorous,successful argument because it seems to involve the Masked Man Fallacy.However,Ibn Sina himself articulates in al-Mubahathat that the FMA is a‘conclusive syllogism".In fact,the key to reconstructing the FMA without committing the Masked Man Fallacy is to reveal its crucial hidden premise:the transparency of primitive self-awareness;and this transparency thesis is implied in Ibn Sind's theory of primitive self-awareness that he elaborates in his late philosophical works al-Mubahathat and al-Ta'liqat.

关 键 词：伊本·西那(阿维森纳) 飞人思想实验 灵魂 自我意识 蒙面人谬论 

分 类 号：B371[哲学宗教—外国哲学]