考虑风险承受差异的供应链企业创新博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Innovation of Supply Chain Enterprise Considering Risk Tolerance Difference

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作  者:米力阳 MI Liyang(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China;School of Science and Chemical Engineering,Ningxia Institute of Science and Technology,Shizuishan 753000,China)

机构地区:[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169 [2]宁夏理工学院理学与化学工程学院,宁夏石嘴山753000

出  处:《物流科技》2024年第9期115-121,共7页Logistics Sci-Tech

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772035);宁夏高等学校科学研究项目(NGY2022153)。

摘  要:针对供应商和制造商研发创新问题,构建两阶段供应链创新博弈模型,分析技术溢出系数、研发投入和风险承受差异对供应链企业创新决策的影响。研究表明,不同研发策略选择下,研发投入临界值不尽相同;当技术溢出系数较高,并且研发投入较低时,双方均自主研发的供应链系统利润最高,而当技术溢出系数较低,或者研发投入较高时,合作研发的优势显著;在考虑风险承受差异的收益分配机制下,风险承受能力强的企业期望利润与风险承受差异负相关,而风险承受能力弱的企业期望利润、最低创新成功率阈值与风险承受差异正相关。Aiming at the problem of innovation between supplier and manufacturer,a two-stage supply chain innovation game model is constructed,and the influence of technology spillover coefficient,R&D investment and risk tolerance difference on the innovation decision of supply chain enterprises is analyzed.The results show that the critical value of R&D investment is different under different R&D strategies.When the technology spillover coefficient is high and the R&D investment is low,the profit of supply chain system under independent R&D by both parties is the highest,while when the technology spillover coefficient is low or the R&D investment is high,the advantage of cooperative R&D is more obvious.Under the income distribution mechanism considering risk tolerance difference,the expected profit of enterprise with strong risk tolerance is negatively correlated with risk tolerance difference,while the expected profit of enterprise with weak risk tolerance and the lowest innovation success rate threshold are positively correlated with risk tolerance difference.

关 键 词:风险承受差异 技术溢出 研发投入 供应链创新 收益分配机制 

分 类 号:F274[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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