杠杆操纵:不为盈余的盈余管理动机  

Leverage Manipulation:Earnings Management Motivation not for Earnings

作　　者：许晓芳 陈素云[2] 陆正飞[3] Xu Xiaofang;Chen Suyun;Lu Zhengfei

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院,100048 [2]河南农业大学经济与管理学院,450046 [3]北京大学光华管理学院,100871

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（财务与会计导刊）（理论版）》2022年第1期3-15,共13页FINANCE & ACCOUNTING GUIDE

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“公司股价崩盘风险与金融机构系统性风险:基于股权质押的视角”(71902001);国家自然科学基金面上项目“‘去杠杆’、风险叠加与经济后果”(71972005);北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心项目“国有企业降杠杆研究——国有企业杠杆风险及其防范”(BTBUGZGL202101);北京工商大学科研启动基金项目“去杠杆、杠杆操纵及其经济后果研究”(19008021177)的资助。

摘　　要：本文以我国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了杠杆操纵与盈余管理之间的关系。研究发现,企业杠杆操纵压力越大(或曰杠杆操纵动机越强),其有利于控制账面杠杆率的盈余管理程度越大,且这一效应在非国有企业中更强,表明杠杆操纵动机确实是企业盈余管理的一种特殊动机。本文的研究不仅丰富和拓展了盈余管理动机方面的研究文献,从资产负债表信息出发研究盈余管理动机,揭示了出于杠杆操纵目的进行盈余管理的这种特殊动机;而且提示公司内外部治理主体尤其是投资者关注资产负债表信息质量,尽力甄别可能存在的杠杆操纵,准确认识企业债务风险水平和收益质量。Based on Chinese A-share listed companies,this paper empirically examines the relationship between earning management and leverage manipulation.It finds that the greater the pressure of corporate leverage manipulation,the more beneficial earnings management will be adopted,and this effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned firms than state-owned enterprises.This shows that leverage manipulation motivation is indeed a special motivation of earnings management.This paper not only enriches and expands the research literature on earnings management motivation by studying earnings management motivation from the perspective of balance sheet information and revealing the special earnings management motivation for the purpose of leverage manipulation,but also reminds internal and external governance entities especially investors to pay attention to the quality of balance sheet information identifing the possible leverage manipulation to accurately understand the level of corporate debt risk and earnings quality.

关 键 词：盈余管理 杠杆操纵压力 产权性质 公司治理 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]