上市公司CEO预期任期影响企业多元化吗?  

Does CEO Expected Tenure Affect Corporate Diversification in Listed Companies?

作　　者：谢会丽[1] 邹思瑜 谭青[1] Xie Huili;Zou Siyu;Tan Qing

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,杭州310000

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（财务与会计导刊）（理论版）》2022年第9期75-85,共11页FINANCE & ACCOUNTING GUIDE

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17BGL232);浙江省教育厅科研项目(Y201840498)。

摘　　要：作为掌舵人的CEO在企业战略决策中起着举足轻重的作用,然而预期任期的缩短会催化CEO私利动机和短视主义倾向,诱发更多的多元化决策,最终损害企业长期利益。基于代理理论和高阶梯队理论,以2013-2020年我国A股上市非金融企业为样本,实证研究CE0预期任期对企业多元化的影响。研究发现,CEO预期任期缩短会为企业带来更多的多元化尤其是非相关多元化,该倾向受到企业CEO决策权及企业内外部监督机制的影响,CEO持股会强化这一倾向,而机构投资者持股对CEO决策权的制约能够起到抑制作用;相较于非国有企业,国有企业严格的内部决策监督机制对CEO决策权力的监督可以有效缓解短预期任期对企业多元化的影响;包含分析师、审计师在内的外部监督机制能够有效制约短预期任期CEO的多元化倾向。As the leader,CEO plays an important role in corporate strategic decision-making.However,the shortening of the expected tenure will catalyze CEO's selfish motivation and shortsighted tendency,inducing more diversified decisions,and ultimately damage the long-term interests of enterprises.Based on the Agency Theory and Highechelon Theory,this paper empirically studies the impact of CEO expected tenure on corporate diversification by taking A-share listed non-financial enterprises in China from 2013 to 2020 as samples.The results show that the shortening of CEO expected tenure will bring more diversification,especially non-related diversification,which is affected by CEO decision-making power and internal and external supervision mechanism.CEO shareholding will strengthen this tendency,and institutional investors'shareholding and participation in corporate governance can inhibit CEO decisionmaking power.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,strict intermal decision-making management system of state-owned enterprises can effectively alleviate the impact of short expected tenure on corporate diversification.The extermnal supervision mechanism including analysts and auditors can effectively restrict the diversification tendency of short term CEOs.

关 键 词：上市公司 CEO预期任期 企业多元化 决策权力 内外部监督机制 CEO持股 机构投资者持股 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]