碳交易和绿色补贴政策下的低碳供应链最优决策与协调  

Optimal Decisions and Coordination of Low-carbon Supply Chain under Cap-and-trade Regulation and Government Subsidy

作　　者：张玉豪 张涛[2,3] Zhang Yuhao;Zhang Tao(School of Business,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215600,China;School of Information Management and Engineering,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏科技大学商学院,苏州215600 [2]上海财经大学信息管理与工程学院,上海200433 [3]上海财经大学上海市金融信息技术研究重点实验室,上海200433

出　　处：《技术经济》2024年第4期159-176,共18页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：上海市自然科学基金“面向文化新媒体智能推荐的多源异构大数据深度挖掘方法研究”(19ZR1417200);上海市科学技术委员会资助项目“科技创新行动计划”(20511101403);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金“基于多源网络数据的文化新媒体用户行为深度挖掘方法研究”(19YJA630116)。

摘　　要：考虑政府的碳交易管制和绿色补贴政策,针对由政府、单个制造商和单个零售商组成的三级低碳供应链,运用博弈理论建立了政府主导下的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型和集中决策模型。重点分析了消费者绿色偏好、碳交易价格和减排成本系数对低碳供应链最优决策和社会福利的影响。利用两部收费契约和低价促销策略分别对所建模型进行了协调研究,并利用数值算例对文中结论进行了验证。研究发现:较强的消费者绿色偏好有利于提高产品的绿色度、渠道成员的利润和供应链的社会福利;产品的绿色度和供应链的社会福利水平在集中决策模型下最高;政府的最优绿色投资补贴率在消费者绿色偏好程度较强时降低而在碳减排难度较大时上升;在参数满足一定条件下,两部收费契约和低价促销策略可实现低碳供应链的完美协调。Three-stage Stackelberg game models and one centralized decision model was established to considered the cap-and-trade regulation and government green subsidy policies in a three-level low-carbon supply chain,which composed of the government,one manufacturer and one retailer.The influences of the consumers green preference,carbon trading price,carbon reduction cost coefficient on the optimal decisions and social welfare associated with different game models are analyzed.In addition,the proposed game models are coordinated by using two-part tariff contract and low-price promotion strategy respectively.Numerical examples are conducted to verify the derived conclusions.The results indicate that strong consumer green preference is beneficial for improving product greenness,channel membersprofits,and the whole supply chains social welfare.The greenness of the product and social welfare are highest under the centralized decision model.The optimal green investment subsidy rate of the government decreases with consumer green preference and increases with carbon emission reduction.When the parameter values satisfy the certain conditions,the perfect coordination of the low-carbon supply chain can be achieved be means of two-part tariff contract and low-price promotion strategy.

关 键 词：碳交易管制 绿色补贴 STACKELBERG博弈 社会福利 两部收费契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]