政府监管下绿色供应链投资减排演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Supply Chain Investment and Emission Reduction under Government Regulation

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作  者:周施敏 黄枭雄 Zhou Shimin;Huang Xiaoxiong(Institute of Logistics Science and Engineering,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区:[1]上海海事大学物流科学与工程研究院,上海201306

出  处:《无锡商业职业技术学院学报》2024年第2期12-22,30,共12页Journal of Wuxi Vocational Institute of Commerce

摘  要:工业化引起的环境污染问题和全球气候变暖问题越来越严重,全球对环境问题的关注度不断提高,政府和社会对碳减排的要求也越来越高。政府为了遵守国际承诺,需要监管企业的碳排放情况,并采取相应措施以实现减排目标。一些企业采取“搭便车”行为,参与其中却不愿意自己直接减少排放,因此投资博弈中可能会出现“搭便车”的问题。为了解决供应商或制造商“搭便车”的问题,将政府监管纳入分析框架,将政府作为博弈的一方,构建政府、供应商和制造商三方演化博弈模型,探讨如何减少供应商和制造商的“搭便车”行为。结果表明:政府积极监管的成本和对供应商、制造商的补贴要在适当的范围内,供应商和制造商都进行减排投资时政府增加的收益、碳税率和碳补贴率越高,越有利于系统向政府积极监管、供应商和制造商减排投资的策略演化;对于供应商和制造商而言,投资减排的成本和“搭便车”的收益越小,越有利于系统的演化。因此,政府应当积极监管和设置适当的动态奖惩机制;供应商和制造商应当制定可持续发展战略,提高能源利用效率,推广低碳技术和设备。The problem of environmental pollution and global warming caused by industrialization is becoming increasingly serious.As global concern about environmental issues grows,the government and society are demanding more and more reductions in carbon emissions.To meet international commitments,the government must regulate carbon emissions from companies and take appropriate measures to achieve emission reduction targets.Some companies are involved but are reluctant to reduce their emissions directly.To solve this problem,this paper introduces government regulation and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government,suppliers,and manufacturers,and discusses how to reduce the free riding behaviors of suppliers and manufacturers.The results show that the costs of active government regulation and subsidies to suppliers and manufacturers should be within a reasonable range.If both suppliers and manufacturers invest in emission reduction,the higher the increase in government revenue,carbon tax rate and carbon subsidy rate,the more conducive it is for the system to evolve towards a strategy where the government actively regulates,and suppliers and manufacturers invest in emission reduction.For suppliers and manufacturers,the lower the cost of investing in emission reductions and the lower the benefits of free riding,the better it is for the system to evolve.Therefore,the government should actively regulate and establish appropriate dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms,and suppliers and manufacturers should develop sustainable development strategies,improve energy efficiency,and promote low-carbon technologies and equipment.

关 键 词:碳减排 演化博弈 政府监管 “搭便车”行为 

分 类 号:F274[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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