主观利己抑或有限利他:罗尔斯的人性观及其伦理反思  

Subjective Self-Interest or Limited Altruism:Rawls’View of Human Nature and His Ethical Reflection

作　　者：敦鹏[1] 张仕斌 Dun Peng;Zhang Shibin(School of Philosophy and Sociology,Hebei University,Baoding,China)

机构地区：[1]河北大学哲学与社会学学院,河北保定071002

出　　处：《社会科学论坛》2024年第3期49-58,共10页Tribune of Social Sciences

摘　　要：人性问题不是罗尔斯《正义论》重点论述的内容,但对人性的界定与使用,却为其整个正义理论的走向提供了前提和基础。在《正义论》中,罗尔斯把原初状态下的人性预设为两个特征:一是人性冷漠而理性利己;二是人性有限利他。这看似矛盾的人性观,实际上是为了满足理想契约环境之下的论证需要。从西方人性传统和文本逻辑上看,罗尔斯的人性论依然倾向于自利目的的利己性而非利他性。虽然罗尔斯的利己人性观在满足分配正义的论证上有其合理性,但理论与实践的脱节使得差别原则在现实中难以落实。因此,反思罗尔斯自利与利他两种人性设计的本义,也为研究罗尔斯正义理论提供了一种新的解释。It is undeniable that human nature is not the focus of Rawls’A Theory of Justice,but its definition and use of human nature provides a prerequisite and foundation for the trend of the whole theory of justice.In his works A Theory of Justice,Rawls presupposes that human nature in the original state has two characteristics:first,human nature is callous,rational and self-interested;second,human nature is limited altruism.In fact,this seemingly contradictory view of human nature meets the needs of argumentation under the ideal contract environment.From the perspective of Western human nature tradition and textual logic,Rawls’theory of human nature still tends to be self-serving rather than altruistic.Although Rawls’egoistic view of human nature has its rationality in satisfying the argument of distributive justice,the disconnection between his theory and practice makes it difficult to embody the principle of difference in reality.Therefore,the author’s reflection on original meaning of Rawls’self-serving and altruistic design of human nature also provides a new explanation for the study of Rawls’justice theory.

关 键 词：罗尔斯 《正义论》 人性 自利 利他 

分 类 号：D091[政治法律—政治学]