高管纵向关联与企业价值——“隧道效应”还是“监督效应”  

Vertical Interlock and Firm Value:“Tunnel Effect” or “Supervision Effect”

作　　者：许罕多[1] 陈晓涵 XU Handuo;CHEN Xiaohan(School of Economics,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China)

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学经济学院,山东青岛266100

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第3期234-239,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BJY016)。

摘　　要：高管纵向关联是加剧了大股东对小股东的利益侵占还是增强了对管理层的监督,是公司治理方向的一个重要问题。以2004—2019年上市公司为样本,手工整理了关联高管的详细信息。研究发现,高管纵向关联与企业价值呈显著负相关关系。机制检验结果表明,高管纵向关联通过加剧大股东掏空发挥了“隧道效应”。进一步研究显示,高管纵向关联与企业价值的负相关性在非国有企业、信息披露程度低的企业以及所处地区法律环境差的企业中更为明显;并且,存在高管直接纵向关联以及董事长纵向关联的公司往往表现出更低的企业价值。文章丰富了纵向关联高管的研究成果,对于提升上市公司治理水平具有重要实践意义。Vertical interlock refers to the senior executives of a listed company who have served as senior executives or had experience in senior management positions in controlling shareholder units.In existing literature,scholars have paid more attention to the impact of horizontal association behaviors of executives such as chain directors on companies,and have paid less attention to the common phenomenon of vertical association among executives in companies.Although at the policy level,the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)proposed the requirements of“three separations”and“five separations”in 1999 and 2001,strictly controlling the appointment of executives in controlling shareholder units at the same time,due to the lack of specific punishment measures,the actual impact is limited.Therefore,the vertical interlock still exists in Chinese listed companies.In theory,on the one hand,controlling shareholders can alleviate the first type of agency conflict with management through vertical interlock,fully exerting their“supervisory effect”on executives and having a positive impact on corporate value.On the other hand,vertical interlock stimulates controlling shareholders to exert a“tunnel effect”,infringing on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and damaging the company’s value.Based on this,whether the vertical interlock exacerbates the encroachment of major shareholders on minority shareholders or enhances the supervision of management is an important issue in the direction of corporate governance.The article enriches the research results of vertical interlock and has important practical significance for improving the governance level of listed companies.This result also provides certain reference value for the introduction of a new governance mechanism of cumulative voting system and future dual equity by regulatory authorities in China.This article takes A-share listed companies in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2004 to 2019 as samples,uses text analysis met

关 键 词：控股股东 高管纵向关联 大股东掏空 企业价值 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]