监管处罚是否存在溢出效应——基于独立董事异议行为视角的经验证据  

Do Regulatory Sanctions Have Spillover Effects:Empirical Evidence Based on the Perspective of Independent Directors'Dissenting Behavior

作　　者：赵书漫 ZHAO Shuman(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei,Anhui 230601)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《上海立信会计金融学院学报》2023年第6期49-65,共17页Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学规划重点项目(AHSKZ2021D07);安徽省高校协同创新项目(GXXT-2021-042)。

摘　　要：作为促进资本市场健康发展的重要举措,监管处罚对连锁独立董事异议行为的影响值得关注。文章以2007-2019年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验监管处罚是否存在溢出效应。研究发现:独立董事被处罚以后,其所兼任公司异议行为的概率和频次会显著增加,即监管处罚对被处罚独立董事兼任公司的异议行为具有溢出效应。异质性分析表明,上述溢出效应在独立董事平均年龄越小、兼任公司数量越少的情况下越显著。进一步分析发现,监管处罚可以通过削弱独立董事兼任公司的内部控制质量或会计信息质量促使独立董事异议行为的产生。文章丰富了监管处罚溢出效应视角的研究文献,同时为独立董事履职行为的研究提供了新思路。As an important measure to promote the healthy development of the capital market,the influence of regulatory punishment on the dissident behavior of independent directors in chain deserves attention.Using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as a sample,this study empirically examines whether there is spillover effect of regulatory penalties.The research findings indicate that after the independent director is punished,the probability and frequency of dissident behavior in other companies they serve in significantly increase,suggesting a spillover effect of regulatory penalties on dissenting behavior in companies where the penalized independent directors serve.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the spillover effect is more significant when the average age of independent directors is younger and when they serve in fewer companies.Further analysis shows that regulatory penalties can lead to the generation of dissenting behavior by weakening the internal control quality or accounting information quality of companies where independent directors serve.This study enriches the research literature on the spillover effects of regulatory penalties and provides new insights for research on the performance of independent directors.

关 键 词：监管处罚 独立董事 异议行为 溢出效应 个人特征 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] D922.287[政治法律—经济法学]